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Abstract
The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) domain is about connecting people and devices
and systems together via sensors and actuators, to collect meaningful information from the
devices surrounding environment and take actions to enhance productivity and efficiency.
The proliferation of IoT devices from around few billion devices today to over 25 billion
in the next few years spanning over heterogeneous networks defines a new paradigm shift
for many industrial and smart connectivity applications. The existing IoT networks faces
a number of operational challenges linked to devices management and the capability of
devices’ mutual authentication and authorization.
While significant progress has been made in adopting existing connectivity and man-
agement frameworks, most of these frameworks are designed to work for unconstrained
devices connected in centralized networks. On the other hand, IoT devices are constrained
devices with tendency to work and operate in decentralized and peer-to-peer arrangement.
This tendency towards peer-to-peer service exchange resulted that many of the existing
frameworks fails to address the main challenges faced by the need to offer ownership of
devices and the generated data to the actual users. Moreover, the diversified list of devices
and offered services impose that more granular access control mechanisms are required
to limit the exposure of the devices to external threats and provide finer access control
policies under control of the device owner without the need for a middleman.
This work addresses these challenges by utilizing the concepts of decentralization in-
troduced in Distributed Ledger (DLT) technologies and capability of automating busi-
ness flows through smart contracts. The proposed work utilizes the concepts of decen-
tralized identifiers (DIDs) for establishing a decentralized devices identity management
framework and exploits Blockchain tokenization through both fungible and non-fungible
iv
tokens (NFTs) to build a self-controlled and self-contained access control policy based
on capability-based access control model (CapBAC). The defined framework provides a
layered approach that builds on identity management as the foundation to enable authen-
tication and authorization processes and establish a mechanism for accounting through the
adoption of standardized DLT tokenization structure.
The proposed framework is demonstrated through implementing a number of use cases
that addresses issues related identity management in industries that suffer losses in bil-
lions of dollars due to counterfeiting and lack of global and immutable identity records.
The framework extension to support applications for building verifiable data paths in the
application layer were addressed through two simple examples.
The system has been analyzed in the case of issuing authorization tokens where it is
expected that DLT consensus mechanisms will introduce major performance hurdles. A
proof of concept emulating establishing concurrent connections to a single device presented
no timed-out requests at 200 concurrent connections and a rise in the timed-out requests
ratio to 5% at 600 connections. The analysis showed also that a considerable overhead in
data link budget of 10.4% is recorded due to the use of self-contained policy token which is
trade-off between building self-contained access tokens with no middleman and link cost.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) domain is about connecting people and devices and
systems together via sensors and actuators, to collect meaningful information from the
devices’ surrounding environment and take actions to enhance productivity and efficiency.
The proliferation of IoT devices from around a few billion devices today to over 25 billion in
the next few years defines a new paradigm shift for many industrial and smart connectivity
applications. Major telecommunication equipment vendors such as Cisco and Ericsson,
[1, 2], reported in early 2019 that there are around 7-8 billion IoT devices connected with
an estimate of 20-25 billion devices to be connected by the year 2023. An earlier report
by Ericsson published in 2016, [3], showed a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of
22-27% for IoT devices surpassing the growth rate of mobile phones, a trend starting from
2018, as shown in Figure 1.1.
The increased usage of IoT devices among a wide spectrum of domains and its prolifer-
ation from 2-3 devices per person today to an expected number of 10-15 devices per person
in the coming years, has already opened up a lot of new opportunities on how data and
1
Figure 1.1: Number of IoT Devices and Growth Rate (2104-2021). Source: Ericsson.
services offered by IoT devices can be monetized [4]. A number of startups and also big cor-
porations are defining new business models for IoT devices’ data exchange including IOTA
as an IoT transaction settlement and data transfer layer, Grid+ by ConsenSys offering
consumers direct access to wholesale energy markets, and Streamr offering a marketplace
for monetizing real-time stream of IoT data [5, 6, 7].
Examples of current IoT products with real monetization concepts include the Nest
thermostat form Google. Nest device is among the early entrants into the IoT world used to
control temperature schedules for the potential to save 10-15% of the money spent on home
energy [8]. Another example is smart street lights which helped the city of Los Angeles to
save 63% on energy costs in the first year using connected street lights [9]. Farmobile is
enabling another real-life example of monetizing IoT data while giving the actual owners
more value. Farmobile is an IoT data aggregator that enables farmers to collect, share and
sell their agronomic and machine data to equipment manufacturers, agronomists, insurers,
and other interested parties. To date, the Farmobile IoT data collection devices have
collected data from various sources in more than one million acres of farmland [10].
2
Figure 1.2: Ranking of IoT Security Weaknesses. Source: IoT Analytics
However, along all the IoT networks benefits many challenges arise, which include
operational challenges linked to devices management and security and privacy concerns.
The device management functionality is considered a crucial task in IoT operations due to
the large number of devices managed and the heterogeneity of the network. A recent report
on IoT platforms market, by Kenneth Research agency, showed that the IoT platforms
market would reach approximately USD 74.74 billion by 2023. It presented that the growth
of IoT device management platforms by year is expected to hit a CAGR of 25.1% in market
size, falling only second to connectivity platforms, which are anticipated to grow at a CAGR
of 26.3% [11].
Whereas smart meters improve usage monitoring and enable remote control and shut
down of energy-consuming devices, however access to records of telemetry data can result
in a security compromise. The concerns about securing authentication, authorization, and
access control for IoT devices, and the information gathered is driving the industry for
3
finer control on who has access to devices and how those devices are used. An industry
report by IoT Analytics covering the period 2017-2022 gathered input from technologists
about the greatest need for improvement in IoT security, where respondents ranked au-
thentication/authorization and access control on top of the list [12], as in Figure 1.2.
To date, one of the most known examples of an IoT network attack is a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the domain registration service, Dyn. This attack
utilized several distributed vulnerable IoT devices through the Mirai botnet and managed
to take down the DNS service of Dyn, which resulted in interruption of services of Ama-
zon, Github, Twitter and Netflix, and others [13]. One of the main reasons behind the
success of such an attack is the ill-defined security and access control roles and reliance on
coarse-grained authorization rules. Coarse-grained roles have been proven as an ineffec-
tive mechanism against many attacks on IoT networks. Therefore, IoT networks require a
mechanism that facilitates operations and still secure communication among the devices by
building a foundation for devices identities linked to an authentication and authorization
mechanism under control of device owners with fine-grained access control rules.
1.1 Motivation
As the number of IoT devices increases in proliferation in factories, on roads, at homes,
and connected to our bodies, the challenges and concerns of unauthorized access to those
devices and the confidential data gathered arise. One of the most profound challenges is
linked to identity management, which pertains to how devices′ identities are authenticated
and verified in addition to how devices establish the means for authorizing and controlling
access to data and services offered.
Furthermore, the access control and authorization mechanism are even more compli-
4
Figure 1.3: A Diagram showing different Systems in a connected vehicle that are accessed
by different entities. Source: CSIdentity
cated when considering having a number of 10-15 devices/user. That can translate to
30-50 devices per smart home or smart asset, and the fact that the setup in many situa-
tions is based on devices procured from different vendors and connected through various
connectivity options. For example, the de-facto standard for managing access to many of
the home-connected devices is performed at the home gateway router with coarse-grained
access rules usually managed and controlled by the communication service provider (CSP).
Another example highlighting the sophisticated devices identity and access management
that defines “who” can access “what” is a vehicle. In a connected vehicle that is equipped
with tens of sensors, few parties play the role of either managing or obtaining access, such
as fleet managers, insurance providers, roadside units, and anyone else using a connected
vehicle.
Thus, providing secure and fine-granularity authentication and authorization frame-
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work for IoT networks is an essential topic in the industry [12]. In this regard, a number
of studies looked at applying the existing authentication and authorization mechanisms in
constrained environments [14, 15, 16]. However, the constrained IoT device environment
presents its own challenges. These challenges are related to suitability of use of current
security protocols, and the demand for designing lightweight security protocols that adapt
to power, processing, and memory limitations. The magnitude of the challenges is mag-
nified by the need of mechanisms that define user-centric and fine-grained authentication
and authorization models, in which devices’ owners are in full control of who access what,
when and how.
However, the vast majority of IoT platforms are based on a centralized model where an
authority handles the interaction between its devices and with other devices belonging to
other authorities [17]. Subsequently, many issues are mounting, especially in the scenarios
in which devices need to exchange data in a peer-to-peer fashion. This specific requirement
has led to the introduction of the decentralized approach since decentralization provides
devices owners the ability to exert direct control over the services and data generated by
the devices.
The distributed ledger technology (also known as Blockchain) can facilitate the imple-
mentation of decentralized IoT platforms, that can maintain a secure and trusted data ex-
change as well as the historical records. In such decentralized architecture, the Blockchain
serves as the general ledger, keeping authentic records of all the transactions and events
exchanged between smart devices in a decentralized topology [18].
Blockchain – a shared and distributed ledger technology – is a suitable candidate to
address the challenges of building a decentralized IoT device management framework. That
is mainly attributed to Blockchain use of cryptographic identifiers, records immutability,
provenance, and tokenization. These features, combined, provide a platform to implement
6
Table 1.1: Blockchain Main Features.
Feature Benefit
Near-real time It enables near real-time settlement of transactions with less friction.
No Intermediary Building on the cryptogrphic proofs it allows any two parties to
transact directly without the need for a trusted third party.
Distributed
Ledger
Making transactions and records synchronization across networks
happen for multi-organizational business networks such as supply
chains or other consortia.
Immutability and
Irreversibility
Blockchain contains recorded and verified blocks of transactions that
are chained and linked to disallow any manipulation of previous
records.
Provenance Having immutable records provide the capability to represent assets
ownership and trace of origin throughout the entire life cycle.
Smart Contracts Stored procedures to process pre-defined business rules to execute
commercial and legal transactions that gets enforced without the
involvement of an intermediary.
the functions of IoT devices identity and authentication and authorization management
that ensures a global and unique identity for the devices, and also provide the mechanism to
maintain it throughout the device life cycle. Applying Blockchain technology for building
a decentralized management framework enables IoT devices to authenticate and authorize
access without requiring a centralized authority to authenticate and authorize access to the
services offered. Besides, such a decentralized architecture, having the Blockchain serve as
the general ledger, enables organizations to keep authentic records of all the transactions
and events exchanged between smart devices in a decentralized topology for purposes of
auditing and accounting [18].
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1.2 Problem Statement
The increased adoption of IoT devices in every day life activity makes these devices among
the most vulnerable targets for attackers. IoT networks’ dynamic and heterogeneous na-
ture, with intermittent device connectivity, makes it possible for an adversary to target
manipulating devices identities (Sybil attack) to take down the reputation of the system.
In case of identity manipulation, it is essential that once the device is affected and get
detected to maintain the history of the reputation incident to prevent it from affecting other
devices. Therefore, having a global and unique device identity with an immutable record is
an approach that can boost confidence in devices’ reputation while roaming heterogeneous
networks and changing ownership throughout the life cycle. The system needs to hold a
transparent and tamper-proof record with access to all historical transactions.
On the other hand, coarse-grained access rules for authorization in IoT networks based
on regular IP networks access control mechanisms, including packet filters and firewalls are
not addressing access rules specific to IoT data and services. In these systems, access rules
are either based on network identifiers such as IP addresses and ports or packet content.
However, IoT devices tend to offer particular and diverse data and services that are more
user-centric. Thus, self-controlled access control rules are more favorable, especially in
peer-to-peer applications, which contribute to a large segment of IoT applications.
Therefore, applying self-controlled and fine-grained access control rules supported by
a decentralized authorization mechanism can ensure that owners have more control over
access to devices’ data and services [12]. This approach requires the capability to map ac-
cess control rules into unique and non-interchangeable access tokens under the sole control
of the device owner. The research addresses some of the main limitations in current IoT
device management platforms with a focus on:
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• Fragmented device identity management systems: The proliferation of IoT devices
in heterogeneous networks, built by different vendors and deployed by multiple op-
erators, created silos of identity management domains that limits portability and
identity life cycle management.
• Lightweight framework in constrained environments: The need for a lightweight
framework is a demand in most IoT applications. These devices are characterized
by their constrained environment and by being deployed in heterogeneous networks,
which require the design of an authentication and authorization framework that pro-
vides a more user and device-centric approach with lower computation requirements.
• Peer-to-peer service exchange: IoT devices are foreseen to operate in a p2p model,
which is not feasible in a central authority coarse-grained authentication and autho-
rization policy. Therefore, self-contained and self-controlled access mechanisms are
required.
1.3 Research Goals
The main goal of this work is to design a decentralized framework for the management
of IoT devices and develop smart contracts that enhance the security, privacy, and au-
thenticity of data exchange and enable peer-to-peer IoT applications. A decentralized IoT
device management framework is sought as the primary goal of this work by achieving the
following objectives:
• Define a layered decentralized IoT device management framework for identity, au-
thentication, authorization, and accounting management based on smart contracts
and distributed ledger.
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• Map the IoT device identity functionality to a decentralized framework that provides
a global and self-owned device identity with features of portability and traceability
throughout the device life cycle.
• Designing an authentication and authorization framework that is more user and
device-centric with lower computation requirement and that enables peer-to-peer
IoT applications.
• Demonstrating the generality and applicability of the proposed framework through
the implementation of several use cases in different domains.
1.4 Contribution
This work proposes a decentralized IoT device management framework for enabling peer-
to-peer and user-centric IoT services exchange. The proposed decentralized framework
significantly reduces the reliance of an IoT device(s) owner on a centralized authority to
control access and perform the service provisioning by building a foundation of decentral-
ized self-owned digital identities and access and authorization tokens in an open verifiable
environment. The proposed framework addresses the problem of IoT device management
from the angles of organizational design, technological foundation, as well as possible busi-
ness models and use cases. The main contributions of this research include:
• The research work produced a decentralized IoT device management framework that
is based on the layers of identity management, authentication, authorization, and
accounting management while highlighting some non-functional requirements, e.g.,
portability and provenance.
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• Defined a decentralized self-owned IoT device identity method based on the W3C
specification, with defined methods for identity transfer and delegation.
• Building a novel concept for authorization and access control model utilizing Block-
hcian tokenization to create a self-contained capability-based access token with fea-
tures of revocation, delegation, and accounting. The designed model is based on
industry standards for tokenization to ensure portability and extensibility.
• Building two use cases that demonstrate how decentralized identity and Blockchain
tokenization are used to solve problems related to smartphone devices theft and
counterfeiting and to build a system that enhances the adherence of pharmaceuticals
supply chain systems to the latest regulations.
• Demonstrating the extensibility of the decentralized device identity management
framework to support building verifiable and provenant data paths. Ensuring that
the consumers of IoT devices data can verify its authenticity and trace it to the
origin.
1.5 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive background to the
IoT device management problem from the perspective of identity management and authen-
tication and authorization functionality. A generic design of the proposed decentralized
framework is devised in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 defines a detailed tokenization approach for a
decentralized IoT devices authorization and accounting mechanism. An anti-counterfeiting
system for smartphones using the designed decentralized identity management framework
is presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, a composable non-fungible blockchain-hosted
11
token as a mechanism for securing the pharmaceuticals supply chain is presented. The
concept of extending the proposed framework to enable provable and verifiable data paths
in IoT networks is introduced in Chapter 7. Finally, the conclusion and future work is
presented in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
The MIT Auto-ID Center firstly introduced the concept of the Internet of Things (IoT)
through Kevin Ashton and David L. Brock back in 1999. Their vision is to establish an
ecosystem that can connect physical objects and real-time service platforms to improve
the lives of human beings. IoT, since its inception, is envisioned of being ubiquitous in all
its aspects, intended to accommodate an interdisciplinary framework to enable connecting
sensing and actuating devices through communication and networking and thus bringing
information and systems in a seamless way to the use of everyone.
IoT applications are expected to include billions of everyday objects in various domains,
namely: smart homes, smart cities, industrial applications, wearables, healthcare, and
many others. A simple illustration included in Figure 2.1 is from my first reading on IoT
in the article ”The Internet of Things” by Neil Gershenfeld, Raffi Krikorian, and Danny
Cohen. The picture explains their vision on how IoT works in a smart home scenario in
the Scientific American October 2004 edition [19].
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Figure 2.1: An IoT Smart Home Example. Source: Scientific American
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2.1 IoT Architecture
IoT is an ecosystem that is building on several technologies and frameworks to enable gath-
ering information from the surrounding environment and connecting devices with humans
and platforms. Enabling this in a heterogeneous setup resulted in the existence of differ-
ent IoT architectures. These architectures each describe the ecosystem from a different
perspective, however, a very simplified representation is composed of three main layers:
• the perception layer is the main interface to the object environment to sense and
collect data.
• the network layer has the functionality of transferring the collected data from the
perception layer to the application layer and deliver telemetry commands to actuators
in the perception layer.
• the application layer contains the intelligence required to carry out the analysis pro-
cedures on collected data and to perform the necessary management functions.
The three layers comprise a set of protocols and frameworks to connect IoT networks
to the Internet and other business processes. For example, the network layer includes
routers and gateways to connect IoT devices to the cloud and to provide an interface to
send data to the application layer. This is achieved using different networking protocols;
such as the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [20], Message Queuing Telemetry
Transportation (MQTT) [21], and Lightweight Machine to Machine (LwM2M) [22].
The application layer includes the analytics and processing applications in addition
to the management functions such as device management, which manages the device life
15
Figure 2.2: Three Layer IoT Architecture.
cycle including configuration, inventory, device identity management and authorization
and access control.
Those device management functions pertain to how devices are identified in the different
layers and the processes used to maintain the device identity during its life cycle. Devices’
identities are a core component in IoT protocols, and they are used in all layers to enable
information routing, service delivery, authentication, and authorization of access. Building
decentralized IoT devices management relies on devices identities as a foundation layer;
thus, the next section introduces the concepts related to identity management and the
work conducted in building device identity management frameworks for IoT.
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2.2 Identity Management in IoT
In general, identity management (IdM) is an administrative domain that deals with iden-
tifying individual entities in a system (such as a user or a device) to enable binding entity
information to identities and thus access to the resources within that system by combining
access rights and constraints with the established identity [23]. The definition also includes
identity creation and management throughout the device life cycle.
According to the ITU-T NGN (Next Generation Network) identity management frame-
work, IdM is defined as the “set of functions and capabilities (e.g. administration, man-
agement and maintenance, discovery, communication exchanges, correlation and binding,
policy enforcement, authentication and assertions)” [24]. IdM primary purpose is to en-
able business and security applications and to provide assurance mechanisms of identity
information that is the core of authentication and authorization schemes. According to
the ITU-T NGN framework, typical functionalities of IdM framework include:
• Identity Life Cycle Management
• Identity Information Correlation and Binding
• Identity Information Authentication, Assurance, and Assertions
• Discovery and Exchange of Identity Information
Fulfilling these functionalities is achieved through three object identity components.
• Identifiers: an identifier is a series of digits, characters, and symbols used to identify
a subject. For IoT devices, this can include Uniform Resource Identifier (URIs),
RFID Tag ID (TID), IP addresses, and other identification schemes.
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• Credentials: which is the set of data providing evidence for claims about parts of
the objects’ identities. Examples of a credential include digital certificates and access
tokens.
• Attributes: which is the set of data that describes the characteristics of a subject.
For IoT devices, attributes may include hardware specification, firmware version,
power options, and other physical or logical attributes.
Identity management functions rely heavily on the device identifier that is used to
address the device in all operations and services. Therefore, the text of next section
extends and lists the major IoT device identification schemes.
2.2.1 IoT Devices Identification Schemes
Identification schemes for IoT devices are mainly driven by other identification specifica-
tions adopted by a number of organizations and standardization entities. These entities
usually use their exclusive identification schemes. Most of the existing IoT devices utilize
some of the these industrial identification schemes. Yet, there is no common identification
scheme for IoT, which is attributed to the political and commercial drivers of the standard
bodies and their sponsors [25].
Although there are various IoT identification schemes, these identification schemes are
used in silos in different verticals. Thus, there is no single global unique identifier adopted
in IoT, which makes interoperability challenging to achieve.
Ensuring interoperability is a key challenge in IoT due to the diverse set of hardware
devices and heterogeneous IoT platforms. This issue is affecting services and applications
that require device identity recognition prior to commencing any exchange of data [26].
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The interoperability problem is aggravated when devices across different platforms start
exchanging services and data, especially in peer-to-peer scenarios. Furthermore, IoT de-
vices are also deployed in a mobile configuration where devices visit and connect to other
networks that need to bind the device to its unique identifier in the home network. Among
the major identification schemes used in IoT networks are:
IMEI
IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) is a 15-digit number, each digit has a
range of 0 to 9 coded as a binary coded decimal and is used to identify each device on
mobile networks [27]. IMEIs are used to distinguish a mobile device among the billions of
devices manufactured. The IMEI DB uses IMEIs to enforce operations related to combat-
ing devices’ theft and counterfeit as devices can be labeled as either whitelisted, greylisted,
or blacklisted. The access to theIMEI DB is offered to 3GPP (3rd Generation Partner-
ship Project) members, including network operators, device manufacturers, and qualified
industry parties. The IMEI identifier is defined by 3GPP TS 22.016 specification [28].
EPC
EPC (Electronic Product Code) is a universal identifier used as an identity for physical
objects in supply chain. EPC specifications require that the id is unique amongst all
objects in the system. It is main use is for tracking goods in supply chain systems that
are part of the EPCglobal Network [29]. RFID tags are usually used interchangeably with
EPC since most of the applications that uses EPC ids utilize RFID Tags as a carrier. In
these applications, a specific Tag Data Standard (TDS) is describing the encoding of EPC
codes onto RFID tags. The EPC standards are over sought by EPCglobal IncTM. EPC
19
identifiers can be represented either as a binary form or text form. The binary forms is
used for storing in the RFID tags while the text form, also known as EPC URI, is used for
identification in IT enterprise systems [29].
UUID
UUID (Universally Unique IDentifier) is class of identifiers that represents represents a
128-bit value. UUIDs are used to identify an entity or object uniquely in a system. The
standard structure of the UUID includes 32 hexadecimal digits representing the sixteen
octets of a UUID. Each UUID is displayed as 36 characters, four of which are hyphens, and
decomposed into five groups of characters as 8-4-4-4-12. The Bluetooth Special Interest
Group governs Bluetooth Low Eneregy (BLE) IoT devices uses UUID as the identification
scheme and assignment of devices IDs (SIG) [30, 31, 25].
EUI
Extended Unique Identifiers (EUI), as per RFC2373 [32], are address formats specified by
the IEEE for use in various layer-2 networks, e.g. ethernet. Two formats of EUI exist;
48-bit EUIs (EUI-48) for MAC addresses and 64-bit EUIs (EUI-64) for IPv6 addresses. In
addition to Ethernet and IP-enabled IoT devices, EUI-64 is used by LoraWAN devices.
LoraWAN is one of the IoT low power wide access connectivity protocols, and LoraWAN
devices use DevEUI as a device ID following the IEEE EUI-64 address format [33].
The aforementioned existing IoT identification schemes share common proprieties in
the current setup, as each has an assigned authority handling the policies and processes of
identifiers assignments. Table 2.2 lists some of the existing mainstream schemes, including
IMEI, Base-UUID, EUI-64 and EPC.
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Many examples show how these identification schemes are utilized by different IoT
frameworks and use them in an isolated way. An RFID tag that carries an EPC code
is not identifiable in a LoraWAN network that is based solely on UUID and vice versa.
Few organizations are working toward the abstraction of devices’ identities since that is
essential to build authentication and authorization frameworks that are agnostic to the
other layers.
2.2.2 Identity and Access Management
A broader definition of IdM is IAM (Identity and Access Management), where in addition to
identity management, the concept expands to include the description of the authentication
and authorization flows. In this context, access is the set of privileges assigned to any
entity for tasks to create or modify a data object or read it. Access is defined through a
set of roles according to the entity attributes and authority.
In IoT, IAM is driven by factors related to the complex and heterogeneous architec-
ture, change of ownership, and intermittent network association. Those factors require a
framework that maintains a global and unique identity of the devices so that they can
be transferred between networks and owners with less impact on its identification and
optimally with no loss of track of the historical records.
In the IT and telecom domain, widely used IAM approaches include the Identity Re-
lationship Management IRM, backed by the Kanatra Initiative [34]. While IRM defines
interesting digital identity relations that apply to IoT devices, Yet particular challenges
exist as it assumes a centralized approach that requires handling many relationship models
that need to be built and maintained in case of IoT networks.
OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect also define two standardized frameworks for authenti-
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cation and authorization [35, 36]. However, the main challenge is that OAuth and OpenID
Connect have mainly been bound to HTTP protocol, which introduces a limitation in the
case of IoT devices that usually due to the constraints in power and memory do not run
on HTTP. New authentication and authorization schemes in IoT are needed for enabling
devices to interact with each other in applications where devices exchange services in an au-
tonomous and decentralized way. The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained
Environments (ACE) is one of the standardized approaches that focus on authorization
and authentication for constrained devices to ensure that miniature IoT devices can still
maintain the required level of security [37].
Privileged identity management (PIM) is another IAM approach [38]. This approach
also provides features of securely storage of the identity data and subject profile. PIM
also offers functionality to control data governance which permits to specify how data is
shared shared based on user privileges. Though while PIM works on reducing the service
attack by ensuring that access is granted and assigned to a specific user, it concentrates
and centralizes the access management policy and turns to be applicable only in enterprise
IoT applications.
Though, due to the unique characteristics of IoT networks represented by heterogeneity,
mobility, scarce resources, and interoperability, directly be applying the existing identity
management systems in IoT networks cannot be satisfy the stringent requirements. These
requirements are of more significant impact on the design of identity and access manage-
ment systems for IoT, especially when considering the nature of applications and services
offered by IoT devices and other concerns of privacy and security.
Some approaches opt for offloading those functionalities to gateways [39, 40], which
does not fulfill the requirement of ensuring a more secure framework. Gateways vulnera-
bility is addressed in many studies as a result of the shared usage of gateway representing a
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single point for attack. One of the most notable examples is the “UDP hole punching” vul-
nerability, which is inherited in many IoT gateways and routers using the built-in features
of the Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) specification [41].
This vulnerability allowed attackers to launch a man-in-the-middle attack by inter-
cepting the connection between the devices, where attackers utilized the very primitive
identification and authentication scheme used. The attack was reported to have affected
more than 2 million IoT devices that connect in a p2p way, including security cameras,
baby monitors, and smart doorbells [41].
Besides, the concentration of authorization rules verification at the gateways resulted
in the usage of coarse-grained access control rules, which also contributes to more relaxed
security measures and widens the surface attack. As an example, the IBM Watson platform
defines two coarse-grained gateways access roles that govern the gateway ability to register
devices to the Watson IoT Platform service, either standard or privileged [42].
2.3 The Distributed Ledger Technology
The distributed ledger technology (DLT), also known as Blockchain, has received in the
last few years a lot of interest in different industries, especially in financial services. While
the first application of Blockchain technology is cryptocurrencies, namely Bitcoin, over the
past few years, an entire ecosystem of institutions and companies have developed different
Blockchain applications. These applications featured new decentralized platforms that
provide fast and secure means of handling domain-specific transactions; in health-care,
postal service, IoT, supply chain, and others [43].
Blockchain is a distributed shared digital ledger that that adopts the concepts of public-
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Figure 2.3: How Blockchain Works
key cryptography that provide the facility of pseudo-anonymity and identity. Blockchain
operations maintain a distributed and immutable ledger through combining several trans-
actions in a single block and hashing its content with the hash value of the previous block
to construct the hash value of the new block, which turns the recorded transactions as ir-
reversible and permanent. This mechanism enables all participants to verify the historical
record down to the first block (the genesis block) [44].
2.3.1 The Chain Structure
Literally, Blockchain’s name can be described by its two keywords; firstly that each (n)
group of transactions form a single block, the second is the linkage of the blocks via
cryptographic hashes into an immutable chain. This form of a cryptographically-based
linked list makes it easy to verify the historical records up to the genesis block, and through
this, it offers the feature of provenance [44].
The other intrinsic feature of Blockchain is its immutability, which makes recorded
transactions irreversible and permanent. For example, the change in the balance of an
25
account is not done through updating a balance field. Instead, each new transaction com-
bined with other transactions is used to form a block that will be validated and distributed
as well as linked to the previous block.
The secure Blockchain workflow can be described in the following steps:
1. An external entity that owns a pair of private/public keys and a blockchain address,
which is a short format of the public key, sends a transaction through a blockchain
node.
2. The transaction is signed by the entity private key, and the blockchain will identify
the entity through its address (public key) in a pseudo-anonymous way.
3. The transaction is validated, and with other transactions occurring in a period of
time are ordered and grouped to form a block.
4. The generated block is used to challenge the mining nodes, the first to solve the
challenge generates the so-called proof-of-work (PoW) and broadcast the block to
the rest.
5. The rest of the networks confirm the validity of the transactions. If confirmed it
inserts the block into the chain by linking it to the previous block, and all of this
occurs according to the consensus algorithm.
6. A global image of the shared distributed ledger is updated, and in case of a financial
transaction, the sender and recipient balances now reflects a change based on the
value submitted in the transaction.
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Figure 2.4: Ethereum Architecture
2.3.2 Ethereum Blockchain
Among the widely adopted Blockchain platforms is Ethereum, and it is a Blockchain ar-
chitecture with an associated state database, capable of storing programs and their state.
These programs are commonly referred to as Smart Contracts. A smart contract can be
deployed by any Ethereum user, and it has a function-based interface or Application Binary
Interface ABI. Once deployed, the smart contract can be referenced by its address, which
is a cryptographic identifier. A user or an application interacts with a smart contract by
sending a transaction to its address as the destination, and with the data payload of the
transaction containing the function signature and input parameters. Calling a function
causes the miners of the network to execute the program and update its state. A smart
contract can hold and send the native value token Ether, and can furthermore call functions
of other smart contracts [45].
Ethereum blockchain provides a “Turing complete” coding system, where theoretically
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Table 2.2: Ethereum Smart Contract Terminology.
Term Definition
Smart Contract The code that is stored, verified and executed on a blockchain.
Contract Address A blockchain address that is generated for each contract once
created.
Constructor A constructor is optional, and it is part of the code that exe-
cuted once as the contract is created.
Function The main part of the smart contract where the logic is built.
Modifier A code used to change the behaviour of functions, for example to
automatically check a condition prior to executing the function.
ABI Application Binary Interface is the de facto method for encod-
ing/decoding data into/out of the smart contract.
code can be put with any logic into an Ethereum smart contract, and it will be run by the
whole network Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). The EVM computation capabilities are
prevented from abuse, by allocating a token (Gas) against each computation, so computa-
tion power is paid for. The ecosystem of Ethereum blockchain-based solutions is made of
the Ethereum network composed of number nodes (can be either public or private), smart
contracts that are implemented in one of the supported languages (Serpent and Solidity)
and user interface through other libraries [45].
2.3.3 Tokenization in Blockchain
Cryptocurrencies and tokens used in Blockchain applications represent a viable solution for
establishing accounting and billing transactions. This trend has been largely attributed to
the standardized and well-defined ERC20 token standard authored by Fabian Vogelsteller
and Vitalik Buterin in 2015 [46]. In addition to ERC20 tokens, which is considered a
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fungible (interchangeable) token, non-fungible tokens (NFTs) also started to become among
the main assets exchanged on Blockchain platforms based on the ERC721 token standard
[47]. That includes examples of game cards and other tradable collectible assets such as
CryptoKitties, Decentraland and DotLicense [47].
The main difference between these two types of tokens is summarized by the fact that
ERC20 tokens are the class of identical interchangeable tokens more of a fiat currency
example, while ERC721 NFTs are the class of unique non-interchangeable token. The
main feature of NFTs is that they represent ownership over digital or physical assets that
include a diverse list of assets such as real-estate, unique artwork, virtual collectibles. This
feature makes NFTs distinguishable and their ownership is trackable on an individual basis.
The thesis author demonstrates through the combination of these two token standards
a foundation to enable a decentralized device access management framework. While the
fungible tokens provide a simple, fast and frictionless transactional medium, NFTs offer
the verifiable immutability and authenticity required in addition to other features such as
delegation, transfer of ownership, and revocation.
2.3.4 Blockchain-Based Identity and Access Management Sys-
tems
A number of studies have proposed Blockchain-based IdM systems [48]. An Ethereum-
based identity management solution was proposed in a work that defined few operations for
decentralized public key infrastructure PKI . Those operations include adding attributes,
signing attributes, and revoking signatures while running a performance test related to
the Gas cost of the different operations [49]. Another identity management system based
on Ethereum smart contracts was introduced by Liu et al., [50], building a virtual user
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identity by binding a public key to user’s entity information. The authors also defined a
token to represent a reputation model for users.
In [51], Axon and Goldsmith introduced a privacy-preserving Blockchain-based decen-
tralized PKI system. They proposed some IdM operations for identity registration and
revocation while enhancing its privacy-preserving feature. Zero-Knowledge Proof based
solutions also were studied, including the work of Hardjono and Pentland [52]. Their work
is built on a permissioned blockchain setup and introduced a technique to anonymize the
subject identity eliminating linking the entity to the performed transactions.
Besides, several companies are building decentralized blockchain-based identity sys-
tems, including Microsoft [53], Evernym [54], and others. For example, Chronicled Inc., is
providing an IoT device registry. Their system uses encrypted microchips (mainly Blue-
tooth low Energy and NFC) to assign a secure digital identity to a physical object and
linking it to a Blockchain record with a focus on the retail industry [55]. On the insti-
tutions and organizations level, Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) maintained by W3C now
considered as the main standard for decentralized identities [56]. Two principal streams
for DID blockchain identity solutions exist permissionless and permissioned blockchain
identity solutions.
A public blockchain identity platform is supported by Ethereum using ERC1056 and
ERC 725/735 through Uport, one of the early startups in the Ethereum ecosystem [57].
Uport is building a decentralized identity solution for applications to solve the digital
identity problem. Uport solution utilizes a set of smart contracts to provide decentralized
identity management operations. On the other side, Sovrin Foundation and Linux Foun-
dation, through the Hyperledger Indy project, offer a complete stack to manage DIDs and
verifiable claims based on a selected and pre-authenticated validating and observer nodes
[58]. Further discussion on DIDs follows in the next section.
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2.4 Decentralized Identifiers and Verifiable Claims
2.4.1 Decentralized Identifiers
Decentralized identifier (DID) is a new paradigm for building global unique identifiers;
those identifiers are built on top of distributed ledgers. DIDs are created as the cornerstone
for decentralized digital identity and public key infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet.
Among the main features is that DIDs offer full control of the DID subject by its owner
without relying on a centralized authority.
The W3C Credentials Community Group maintains the DID specification, and those
specifications describe the data model and syntax for decentralized identifiers [56]. DIDs
specifications are designed to be compatible with any distributed ledger or network, where
up to date there are more than 10 different Blockchain systems that support resolving DIDs.
For example, the Ethereum Blockchain supports that through more than one implementa-
tion and among them the use of ERC1056 to enable a decentralized identity management
system [59].
DIDs are defined by a generic format URL that is used to address DID documents and
to be resolved by a DID resolver. DID generic format is a URI scheme conformant with
the web standards as per RFC3986 [60]. DID is composed of three essential fields and can
contain specific custom fields. The essential fields include the urn scheme in this case ’did’
following that is the namespace or method name (e.g. ethr, sov ... etc), and following
is the method-specific identifier which can be a combination of letters and numbers (e.g.
”did:example:12345AbCDEfgh”).
”did” : ”method− name” : ”method− specific− id” (2.1)
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2.4.2 DID Documents
In this decentralized scheme, DIDs are considered as a global key-value database where
DID-compatible blockchains host the DID documents, where DIDs act as keys, and DID
Documents are the values. DID Documents are constructed as JSON-LD objects describing
the specified data model presented as a set of fields, including the public keys, authenti-
cation protocols, and service endpoints necessary to bootstrap cryptographically-verifiable
interactions with the identified entity. These different fields are used either for proof pur-
poses, verification methods, or describing service endpoints [56].
{
"@context ": "https ://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
"id": "did:example :123456789 abcdefghi",
"authentication ": [{
"id": "did:example :123456789 abcdefghi#keys -1",
"type": "RsaVerificationKey2018",
"controller ": "did:example :123456789 abcdefghi",
"publicKeyPem ": "---BEGIN PUBLIC KEY...END ---\r\n"
}],
"service ":
[{
"id":"did:example :123456789 abcdefghi#vcs",
"type": "VerifiableCredentialService",
"serviceEndpoint ": "https :// example.com/vc/"
}]
}
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According to W3C specification [56],the standard elements of DID Document include
the following fields:
• Context: The value of this key MUST be the URL for the generic DID context:
https://w3id.org/did/v1.
• DID Subject: The DID subject field contains a valid DID as the identifier of the
DID Document.
• Public Keys: A DID document may include an array of public keys stored in differ-
ent formats (e.g. PEM, base64, HEX). The public keys are used for authentication
and authorization purposes as well as establishing secure communication with defined
service endpoints.
• Authentication: It defines the mechanism used by a DID subject to prove that it
is associated with a DID. This field is defined as an array of verification methods,
where each method can be embedded or referenced to the listed public keys.
• Authorization: It is used to state the operations that can be performed on behalf
of the DID subject. The most preferable approach is to utilize a capability-based
approach to define details of authorization and delegation.
• Service Endpoints: This field specifies the methods of interaction with the DID
subject to enable discovery and interaction.
• Created/Updated: These are optional fields to include a timestamp of the original
creation and recent change used mainly for auditing.
• Proof: It is represented by a digital signature forming a cryptographic proof of the
integrity of the DID Document.
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The main feature of DIDs is their independence of a central party, the Identity Provider
IdP. Instead, DIDs are managed by the identity owner or a guardian on behalf of the owner,
which is known as self-sovereign identity (SSI). Finally, DIDs and DID Documents form
the first layer of decentralized identity; however, the capability to tie DIDs to claims is
achieved when combined with verifiable credentials.
2.4.3 Verifiable Credentials
A verifiable credential (VC) is the representation of physical credentials such as a driver’s
license, a university degree, or ownership of certain assets. The use of digital signatures
makes verifiable credentials more tamper-resistant and credible than the physical creden-
tial. In practice, upon the request of a verifier, the holder of a verifiable credential can
generate a presentation of this credential and share it to prove that the holder possesses
this credential with the defined parameters [61].
According to the W3C specifications, specific fields are used to construct a verifiable
credential object. Those fields include context field and identifier field which are URIs
pointing to a readable and valid JSON-LD document about the field subject. The other
field is the credential subject, which contains claims about the subject and referenced by
the subject id, which is a DID. Another mandatory field is the issuer field that contains a
URI (DID) pointing to a document containing information about the issuer identity. An
issuance field based on ISO 8601 format is also required to express the time of issuing a
verifiable credential. Furthermore, for a credential to be verifiable, a proof field represented
by ,e.g., a digital signature, is required, where the method used for verification is defined
in the type property [61].
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Figure 2.5: DID Infrastructure Roles
2.4.4 DID Infrastructure Roles
In a DID infrastructure, there are at least four roles need to exist [61], as follows:
• Holder — the individual or organization in control of the digital wallet used to control
the use of a given credential. Important to note that the Holder may not always be the
subject. The holder, in this case, is the one in control of the private keys associated
with the subject DID (e.g. a phone may be the Subject of a digital identity, but the
phone owner is Holder of that identity)
• Issuer — the individual or organization issuing credentials.
• Verifier — the individual or organization performing the verification of a given cre-
dential.
• Validators — the trusted parties validating identities stored on the distributed ledger.
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2.4.5 Use of DIDs for IoT Devices Identity
Building a decentralized identity for IoT devices using DIDs has seen great interest in the
last year. IoTex and Ockam have both proposed two DID methods did:io and did:ockam,
respectively. Both methods are proposing the main identity operations with Ockam pro-
viding an SDK for users to register identities and submit and verify claims [62], [63]. The
authors in [64] also suggest the use of DIDs and VCs to address how a centralized OAuth
server is extended to support issuing DIDs and VCs as a delegated entity on behalf of
constrained IoT devices. The authors also addressed an identified path for improving their
work by combining DIDs and VCs to offer a granular and flexible method in managing
access control policies and user authorization.
Interest from standardization bodies includes the recent work proposal that has been
started by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to assess the feasibility of
Decentralised Identifiers (DIDs) in IoT networks [65]. Also, The Linux Foundation and
Hyperledger Blockchain project host two projects to define a decentralized identity man-
agement framework for IoT devices and possible use cases. Among these two projects is
the IoT subgroup under the Telecom Special Interest Group (TSIG), in which the author of
this thesis is participating in defining a decentralized IoT identity and access management
specification [66].
2.5 Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
Authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) is the framework controlling access
to devices resources, enforcing policies, auditing usage, and providing the information
necessary for billing, which is centered around identity management service [67].
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The first component of the AAA framework is authentication, which is the process by
which a user or device identifies itself to another user/device. For example, a device can
authenticate to a service or a device can authenticate to another device. The process of
authentication is based on each user/device having a unique set of attributes (credentials)
grouped as a unique identity. Authorization is the process pertaining to the means by which
a device determines what privileges other devices/users have on the device and what actions
they can perform. Thus, it defines the process of policy enforcement by identifying the
types of activities, resources, or services a device/user is permitted to perform or access.
The third A is for accounting, and it considers the process of measuring resources usage
during access time. This includes the amount of time or the amount of data a device has
used during a session. The accounting function is mostly performed by logging of session
statistics and usage information to be used for control, billing, and analysis.
In existing IT and Telecom networks, major frameworks coexist, including the RADIUS,
Figure 2.6: AAA Framework Components.
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DIAMETER, and KERBEROS frameworks, to provide the AAA functionalities [67]. In
IoT networks, and due to the need to support heterogeneous networks with intermittent
connectivity and dynamic authentication/authorization relationships, an automated and
autonomous framework for authentication/authentication with less centralization and sup-
port for scalability need to be devised.
Moreover, most of the existing frameworks are based on a central authority that con-
trols the storage of all identities, performs the matching of authentication requests, and
then provides access upon authorization requests. Those centralized systems represent a
major single-point-of-failure condition, where an adversary that compromises the central
AAA servers can disturb the authorization and policy management of the entire network.
This becomes even more challenging when we consider peer-to-peer transactions that are
characterized as a mainstream application domain in IoT networks.
Devices and data ownership are among the objectives of many regulatory frameworks
such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [68]. These regulations require
granting users the ownership of the data their devices generate, which shows clearly that a
decentralized approach would be a necessity to satisfy technical, business, and regulatory
requirements.
Furthermore, analyzing further how current telecom operators and service providers run
the AAA systems show that the centralized approach is limiting the granularity level of the
AAA functionality required to enable per device or owner policy design and enforcement
[69]. As per the current situation, an operator of a AAA service enables authorizing access
to services or devices based on coarse-grained attributes such as IP address, port, or QoS
level, and this does not offer fine-grained access control on resources and services deployed
on IoT devices.
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2.5.1 Access Control Models
An access control system is described by the set of rules defining the control functions of
the who, what and when. Entities such as users or devices are normally called subjects,
and a rule can determine what actions can be performed based on the rights granted on
which resources, while resources usually called objects.
The different access control (AC) models include Access Control Lists (ACLs), Role-
based Access Control (RBAC), Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC), and Capability-
based Access Control (CapBAC). The most common form of access control is based on
access control lists (ACLs), which is a centralized approach to support administrative
activities, that assigns access rights to specific subjects. However, as the number of subjects
and resources increases, confused duty problems are identified in ACL, and access rules
become much more complex to manage [70].
To overcome the challenges of simple ACLs systems, the Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) approach [71, 72, 73] was designed. RBAC systems assign access rights to roles,
and subjects are granted access only if they have been assigned the right role. RBAC
supports access control principles such as least privilege authorization and partition of
administrative functions. However, RBAC suffers from the roles explosion problem as the
number of resources grows, which makes it unsuitable for implementing security policies
that require interpreting complex and indistinct IoT scenarios.
Recently, capability-based access control CapBAC was proposed in few studies [70, 74,
75, 76]. CapBAC is based on issuing a communicable and unforgeable token that the
owner can assign to other subjects. The core principle is that those capability tokens are
issued by the object owner and granted to the subject with minimal interaction of a central
authority, which makes it more aligned for decentralized architectures.
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2.5.2 Access Control Models Suitability
Assessing the suitability of those different approaches to the IoT scenarios and specifically
to the decentralized architecture proposed in this work is based on several factors. The
work in [77] and [78] provide a solid analysis of the different approaches and highlight the
major advantages and disadvantages which are compiled here in a radar chart to depict
the coverage each approach is providing considering those multivariate factors, Figure 2.7.
The CapBAC model, as shown in the previous figure, demonstrates wider coverage
in most aspects except the interoperability factor which defines the portability of any
access control rule between different systems. This disadvantage, however, is enhanced in
this work by utilizing a standardized token issuance model which provides a standardized
interface on how these tokens can be consumed. The context-awareness aspect also ranks
low, which can be improved by augmenting more contextual information in the capability
token issued in a compromise of lightweight representation.
Figure 2.7: Radar View of AC Models fitness to AAA requirements in IoT Networks.
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2.6 Summary
This chapter has discussed the fundamentals of IoT networks and the challenges of man-
aging a large number of devices while ensuring security and privacy. The IAM concepts in
IoT were highlighted with elaboration on the commonly used identification schemes. The
chapter also discussed the leading technologies and frameworks proposed in the domain of
decentralization, including Blockchain, smart contracts, and decentralized identifiers.
Based on the study of state-of-the-art, it can be noticed that to secure IoT devices
and enable peer-to-peer applications a foundation layer for decentralization is needed.
The foundation layer of decentralized global and unique device identity is considered the
cornerstone to building other security schemes for authentication and authorization as well
as providing more control of users on their IoT devices and the generated data. In the next
chapter, an IoT device identity framework will be proposed based on the DIDs specification
to provide a framework to manage IoT devices identities in a decentralized approach.
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Chapter 3
Decentralized IoT Identity and
Access Management Framework
The need for identity management is essential in all IT enterprise systems to handle the
authentication and authorization flows. Moreover, in IoT, the demand is driven further by
factors related to the high number of devices, complex architecture, change of ownership,
and intermittent network association. Those factors require building a global and unique
identity of the devices so that they can be transferred across networks and ownership
changed among users with less impact on the devices’ identification and optimally with no
loss of track of the historical records.
In this work, identity is treated as a living asset, such that a device is given an identity at
birth (e.g., manufacturing). The device maintains its identity with updates and versions as
pre-defined changes happen, which is maintained in a global registry to enable verification,
tracking, and auditing. According to the ISO/IEC 24760-1, ”an entity is an item inside
or outside an information and communication technology system, such as a person, an
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organization, a device, a subsystem, or a group of such items that has recognizably distinct
existence”, while identity is the ”set of attributes related to an entity” [79].
The suggested approach for a decentralized IoT devices identity and access framework
is based on the concept of Decentralized Identifiers DIDs and the use of smart contracts
for rule processing automation. Earlier work by the author was based on proprietary DID
definitions [80]. This work builds a DID method for IoT devices that is used for defining
devices’ global and unique identities, which are used as the base for devices authentica-
tion. For access control, decentralized access rules are defined as tokens with engraved
capabilities that translate actors given privileges.
This chapter first highlights the framework stack and continues by discussing the decen-
tralized identity model, then the proposed identity management layer architecture listing
the different components. Next, the proposed DID method for IoT devices is described
and then highlighting how the IoT DIDs are utilized in the authentication process. Au-
thorization and access control are discussed in Chapter 4.
3.1 Framework Layers
A recent trend aims to build decentralized architecture for IoT networks, which is con-
sidered very important in the service layer. Achieving that requires that the underlying
functionalities represented by the identity, authentication, and authorization management
should be designed in support of this scheme. This work suggests a decentralized identity
and access management framework that provides global and unique devices identities that
facilitates devices to authenticate each other in a peer-to-peer fashion. The framework uti-
lizes the Blockchain tokenization concepts to facilitate the authorization and accounting
flows with no middle man.
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Figure 3.1: Framework Stack.
The proposed decentralized framework is based on the distributed ledger and smart
contracts technology, and composed of the following layers:
• the foundation layer is the Ethereum Blockchain network hosting the different smart
contracts and providing the built-in features of immutability, provenance, and cryp-
tography. Also, this layer uses the decentralized storage service (InterPlanetary File
System - IPFS) to enable global access to identity information [81].
• Decentralized identity management layer is the core element for enabling decentral-
ization in higher layers. This layer facilitates creating decentralized services in other
layers by defining a DID IoT method with the necessary smart contract(s) to govern
the process flow.
• The authentication layer relies on having devices’ identities deployed and accessible
in a decentralized way to allow devices to perform mutual authentication with no
middle man.
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• The authorization layer provides decentralized access control, which is realized by
representing access rules as tokens on Blockchain, while these tokens are issued and
managed by devices and exchanged in p2p fashion.
• Accounting layer is also another layer utilizing Blockchain tokens (ERC20 tokens) to
credit devices for services offered and exchanged.
The next sections provide the details about the first three layers with considerable
focus on the identity management layer while the authorization and accounting layers are
discussed in the next chapter.
3.2 Foundation Layer
The foundation layer provides implicitly the infrastructure required for cryptography, busi-
ness rules automation, virtual machine, and storage. The Ethereum Blockchain enables
the tracking of all transactions and ensures the existence of the immutable records, which
are required for tracking and auditing purposes. The distributed file storage system rep-
resented here by InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) [81]. IPFS provides the distributed
storage infrastructure necessary to ensure that IoT devices and the generated data have
the required portability and that it is offered in a provider-agnostic approach with the
capability to be extended to support data protection and a traceability mechanism [82].
The two platforms, Ethereum and IPFS, are used to complement each other. In avoiding
storing large data volumes on the Blockchain, where data, including identities attributes
and access policies metadata, are stored on IPFS and the hash value of the stored data is
linked to the transaction stored in the Blockchain to ensure the integrity of off-chain data.
45
While it is known that certain security issues may affect the use of IPFS for storing privacy-
sensitive applications, this is not the case in this proposed framework. The intended use
of IPFS in this thesis is for storing the DID Documents which are to be made accessible
to any device to resolve a DID identifier into the corresponding document.
3.3 Decentralized Device Identity Layer
3.3.1 Identity Management Architecture
In general, Identity Management (IdM) systems are based on an architecture represented
by three independent parties: the subject (a device or a user), service provider (SP),
and Identity Provider (IdP) [83]. The IdP is the party responsible for managing identity
information, including identifiers, credentials, and attributes. In a traditional IdM, IdPs
have the central role of allowing users/devices to roam across different SPs and obtain
access to offered services.
Figure 3.2: Traditional IdM Architecture and Flow of Interaction.
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A simple illustration of the main steps involved is depicted in Figure 3.2. The flow is
initiated by a subject requesting access to a service, where the SP responds by redirecting
the subject to an IdP that handles the authentication process. Upon successfully authen-
ticating the subject, the subject re-issue the access request with a proof of identification.
Ultimately, the access is granted based on a trust mechanism that in this case is built
based on the centralized third-party IdP.
The proposed decentralized architecture adopts a similar flow of interaction with the
elimination of the middle man (IdP) to enable a decentralized global identity register with
self-governing over identity management functionalities. In the proposed architecture,
Figure 3.3, the IdP is replaced by two components:
• Identity Manager Smart Contract: a smart contract handling the identity regis-
tration and management interactions acting as an identity anchor and utilizes DIDs
Figure 3.3: Decentralized IdM Architecture and Flow of Interaction.
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as the unique primary identifier to ensure a global and unique device identity
• Decentralized Identity Hub: A DID documents hub to store identity information
and enable querying and verification of identities’ attributes.
3.3.2 Identity Relationship Modelling
It was discussed in Chapter 2 that the usage of traditional device management frameworks
in IoT lacks a unified and global identification scheme that deals with the issues of het-
erogeneity and the need for identity interoperability and portability. Thus, by proposing
a decentralized identity management framework, this work describes an identity relation-
ship model that defines the different components and maps their inter-relationships. The
discussion examines the device identity life cycle and the device-identity relation and how
it affirms identity uniqueness.
Device Identity Life Cycle
In the IoT networks, a device will go through a life cycle starting from manufacturing until
the end of life. The proposed decentralized IdM architecture depicts a cycle that defines
the device status and its ownership. In this life cycle, the device identity is required to be
maintained through a global registry that permits authorized registrants (e.g., manufac-
turers) to create new identities for new devices. It allows the registrant to either perform
identity management functions or transfer ownership of the device(s) to other owners, e.g.,
operators and end-users.
The device identity is maintained and updated through the different phases, where a
new version, if required, is issued as the device’s owner changes or the device status on
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Figure 3.4: IoT Device Lifecycle and Ownership.
the network changes from provisioning to in-service to retire while maintaining a unique
global identifier, as illustrated in Figure 3.4.
According to the device life cycle, the ownership and service consumption relationship
between an IoT device, the owner, and the different consumers frequently change over a
device’s lifetime. Thus, the framework asserts that a device, the Subject (S), should have
a specified Owner (O) at any point of time (t), and there exist (n) number of Consumers
(CS) to which a device is providing services.
S 3 O,< CS1, CS2, ...CSn > (3.1)
From a service point of view, a subject that is providing a service is considered a Service
Provider (SP), and the consumers can be either users, systems, or other devices (subjects).
Thus, a subject represented by a device can act as both a service provider or a consumer.
Subject-Identity Relationship
The proposed relationship model between subjects (devices), identities, and attributes is
built on a one-to-one relationship between the subject and its identity and one-to-many
49
Figure 3.5: Subject-Identity-Attributes Relationship Model.
relationship between an identity and the composing attributes and credentials, as shown
in Figure 3.5. In addition, a global unique identifier is essential, and can be anonymous.
Thus, for a network (NET ) with (n) subjects (S), there exists (n) unique decentralized
identities (DID) each with a unique identifier (ID), where the identity is defined by a set
of attributes (A) and credentials (Cr) as defined in Equation. 3.2.
Si 3 DIDi, s.t. DIDi = (IDi, < Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Ain >,< Cri1, Cri2, . . . , Crim >) (3.2)
Uniqueness of Identity
The proposed framework asserts that each device in any network should maintain a global
and unique identity. Therefore, for (NETi) that represents any network among K IoT
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networks, each with (n) number of devices/subjects (S).
NETi = { Si1, Si2, . . . , Sin} ; i = 1, K (3.3)
Where each subject Sij holds a unique DIDij,in different networks of size l and m
∀ Sij ∈ NETi, ∃DIDij, s.t. @DIDlm ≡ DIDij, i 6= l ∨ j 6= m (3.4)
A high-level view on different interactions between subjects is depicted in Figure 3.6,
which shows how any device (Sij) can have the role of either a service provider or a
consumer, and the relationships to owners and other consumers.
Figure 3.6: High Level View on Subjects Relationships.
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3.4 Decentralized IdM Components Description
The essence of the proposed identity management layer architecture is based on the main
concepts of Blockchain. These concepts are used to match the objectives of establishing
a global registry with a unique and global identifier for each device, a higher degree of
anonymity, immutable records that are traceable to the genesis of the identity creation,
and with minimal third party authority.
The suggested architecture is based on three components: identity manager smart
contract running on Ethereum Blockchain, a DID Hub implemented on IPFS network, and
a DID resolver and a newly proposed DID method specific to IoT devices, as in Figure 3.7.
• The IdM smart contract is implemented on Blockchain and is used to build the
global registry with specific rules to enable authorized and identifiable entities of the
creation of the device identity. The public key cryptography is used as the means to
ensure establishing a global and unique identifier for each device if no identification
scheme exists or when anonymity is required. The created DID identifier is anchored
Figure 3.7: Identity Management Layer Components and Actions Flow.
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in the smart contract to ensure maintaining an immutable record.
• The DID Hub is the primary storage component for the created DIDs documents.
The DID Hub can be hosted on any storage service, and in this proposal, the choice
was the IPFS network to guarantee a decentralized storage option.
• A DID Resolver is essential to enable resolving a DID identifier into the corresponding
DID document stored in the DID Hub. Both the identity manager smart contract
and the DID resolver implement the supported identity operations of the proposed
DID method.
• The DID method is not a specific component, yet it is the syntax and definitions
of DID identifiers and documents format in addition to the definitions of different
methods supports. The different actions in Figure 3.7 are translated to DID method
operations.
3.4.1 Actions Flow
As indicated above, each device as a subject can perform different actions, and so are
device owners. The actions flow is depicted in Figure 3.7, where actions for creation,
updating, or transfer of a DID pass through the smart contract to commit and modify the
records in Blockchain and update the corresponding Document in the DID Hub. Querying
is performed through the DID resolver that uses the DID identifier as an index to retrieve
the corresponding DID Document.
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Identity creation
Identity creation is based on public-key cryptography and hashing functions. The identity
is composed of the minimal set of attributes, < Ai1, Ai2, . . . , Ain >, necessary to generate
a unique and global identity for the device in the global registry. That is performed in
two steps: generation of cryptographic keys and Blockchain address and the formation of
the Blockchain-based digital identity. The decentralized identity approach is suggested to
either build anonymous identifiers using the cryptographic keys or use the device technology
unique identifier (e.g., IMEI or UUID) as the DID identifier.
In Blockchain, specifically in Ethereum, each account (e.g., device) first obtains a pair
of private and public keys, from which a Blockchain address is derived based on the result
of the hashing function of the public key. A reduced version of the details of the generation
of the key pair and Ethereum address, as per [45], is given below:
1. An initial seed vector (IV) is used with a key derivation function such as PBKDF2-
SHA256 to generate a 256-bit (32 bytes) private key (SK).
2. The 512-bit (64 bytes) public key (PK) is generated from that secret key (SK) using
the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA).
3. The Public Key is hashed with SHA-3 (Keccak) to produce a 256-bit output, where
the upper 96 bits are discarded, and the lower 160 bits (bits 96 to 255) become the
Blockchain Address.
Addr(SK) = β96..255(KEC(ECDSAPUBKEY (SK))) (3.5)
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The identity creation is performed according to the procedure defined hereafter, where
the owner issues a request to the IdM smart contract to generate a new DID. Upon success,
the contract commits the DID record on-chain and stores the DID Document on the hub.
Algorithm 1: Identity Creation
Input: id, pubKey, owner, proof, hash
Result: (DID) Committed on Chain
procedure GenerateDID(id, pubKey, owner, proof);
if IsSenderAuthorized then
DID ⇐ CreateDIDIdentifier(id);
if DID not exists then
valid⇐ verifyProof(pubKey, proof);
if valid then
ipfsHash⇐ storeIPFS(DIDDocument);
ListDIDs[DID]⇐ ipfsHash;
else
Ignore;
end
else
Return(′IdentityAlreadyExists′);
end
else
Ignore;
end
Transfer of Ownership
According to the IoT Security Foundation (IoTSF) [84], it is inevitable to limit IoT devices
from changing the ownership throughout their lifetime, and among the essential tasks in
device management is to preserve the auditing trail, the security of the device and its
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reputation profile throughout the life cycle. Thus, as devices are transferred from one owner
to another, the proposed identity management framework defines the flow highlighted in
Figure 3.10 to ensure:
• Sustaining a device’s global and unique identity by maintaining the same DID iden-
tifier.
• Check the current ownership before performing the transfer of ownership action to
disallow unauthorized actions.
• The change of ownership is performed by changing the owner identifier in the DID
Document then request the new owner’s signature for the updated DID document.
• Commit the update on Blockchain to maintain the auditing trail.
The transfer of ownership process is managed through the identity management smart
contract that implements the logic of the IOT DID method. For a devi and owner Oj, the
owner issues a request of transfer to the smart contract defined ABI. Based on the content
of the identity parameters, the smart contract’s specific modifiers authenticate the source
of the origin (ensure issuer is the owner) and the authority it has.
Upon successful authentication and authorization, the identity attributes get updated;
specifically, the owner related fields are now reflecting the new owner public key with a
signature proof for the integrity check. The new version of the identity document is stored
in the identity hub, and the DID record on-chain is updated with the new hash maintaining
the trail of all identity updates.
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3.4.2 IOT DID Method
Enabling decentralized identity management for IoT devices is based in this proposal on
the use of DID specifications and the proposed IoT Devices DID method. This method
defines how the framework suggests creating DIDs and DID documents. The introduced
method is designed to conform to the DID specification requirements [56].
Method Name and Identifiers Syntax
The proposed method name that shall identify this DID method is iotdev, and any created
DID that uses the proposed method must start with the following prefix did:iotdev in
lowercase format. A DID based on iotdev method should have the following format:
did -iotdev = "did:iotdev:" iotdev -identifier
iotdev -identifier = *( idtype ":") idstring
idtype = "imei" / "epc" / "uuid" / "eui"
idstring = ALPHA / DIGIT
The proposed method and identifier syntax supports different IoT devices identification
schemes where the identifier has an optional idtype path that currently supports IMEI,
UUID, EUI, and EPC identifiers. An anonymous DID identifier is also supported as the
default iotdev-identifier, which is the Ethereum address of the device derived as in Section
3.4.1. The different examples of iotdev identifiers are:
did:iotdev :0 xb217366aDe3f65E8D2A79f0Da1B607Aa0E399f56 // Default
did:iotdev:imei :351756051523999 // IMEI number
did:iotdev:uuid :123 e4567e89b12d3a456426655440000 // UUID no hyphens
did:iotdev:eui :00152 BFFFEE49B60 // EUI no colons
did:iotdev:epc :0614141000734314159 // EPC no dots
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DID Document Format
The objective of using DIDs and DID Documents is to enable a global, unique, and im-
mutable identifier and to provide the utility for performing mutual authentication and
verification of devices identities with no middle man. The DIDs are also offering a utility
to provide the capability of service discovery. The IOT DID method proposed document
format is composed of the attributes derived from the W3C specifications as in Table 3.1
Method Operations
The IOT DID method supports the default CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Deactivate)
operations. In addition, it provides two extended methods: transfer of ownership and
update delegate.
• Create The DID Create operation is implemented through the identity manager
smart contract to offer to register any new device DID. The create process establishes
the unique decentralized identifier based either on the technology specified identifier
or by creating an Ethereum address for the device. The initial device owner registers
a DID and constructs the DID Document providing a cryptographically signed proof
as one of the document attributes.
The DID document is constructed offline and appended by the proof, so it does not
require submitting a transaction to the Blockchain except when the DID identifier
and DID document hash are recorded on the Blockchain through the smart contract.
Storing only the DID identifier and document hash on the Blockchain limits the
storage capacity on Blockchain. It instead utilizes the decentralized storage of the
IPFS network for storage. The authenticity of the document is ensured through the
hash value, which is used to map the DID to the stored document on IPFS.
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Table 3.1: IOT DID Method Document Format
Attribute Definition
@context Contains the default URI schema,
’https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1’.
id Defines the subject identifier as per the method definition.
created A timestamp for the time when the DID document is first cre-
ated.
updated A timestamp that gets changed every time the DID document
is updated.
revoked An attribute that exists in a DID document only if the identity
has been revoked, and in that case, the timestamp indicates
when revocation took place.
publicKey An array of different public keys of different stakeholders related
to the DID. This attribute should include at least two public
key one tagged with the fragment (#owner), and the other one
is the device public key tagged with the fragment (#device)
used by the device for cryptography operations.
authentication An array of verification methods and again at least one entry
should exist linked to the owner public key.
proof A digital signature used to check the integrity and verify the
authenticity of the document stored off-chain. The proof should
include four items: the signature method used, a timestamp, the
public key of the issuer, and the signature itself.
service An array listing the different services offered by the device
linked to this identity, in this work this attribute is used for
advertising the authorization smart contract used for access
control and enable other devices to discover it.
recovery An optional attribute that is introduced to mitigate for key loss
where an owner can be encouraged in the business process to
generate a recovery key used to manage the DID in case of loss
of primary owner key.
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• Read An IoT DID is resolved to a DID document that is stored on IPFS in the Read
operation. The DID resolver provides an API endpoint to query a DID identifier and
obtain its corresponding hash and then use the hash to retrieve the document object.
• Update The Update operation is considered in the proposed method to perform an
update of any of the fields of publicKey, authentication, or service and to add any
new attributes. Updating a DID document is issued as a transaction to identity
manager smart contract to check two conditions:
– If the issuer of the transaction is the owner or an authorized delegate.
– The signature on the proof attribute is valid and verified against the issuer
public key.
Upon issuing the updating process of a DID document, a new proof is created, and
a new DID Document is stored in the IPFS DID Hub. The newly created IPFS
document will generate a new hash that is used to update the DID record in the
smart contract.
• Transfer (of Ownership): The Transfer operation is a subset of the update op-
eration where it updates the publicKey attribute defined by the owner fragment.
This operation is treated separately to support a different event for the transfer of
ownership. Transferring a DID ownership requires that the transaction passes the
conditions of ensuring that the owner has issued the transaction and that the new
proof signature is valid and verified.
• Delegate The Delegate operation is also a subset of the update operation where
it updates the delegate attribute, either to add, update or delete a delegate. Once
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more, the same conditions as in the update operations should apply for the operation
to be successful.
• Revoke/Deactivate The Revoke operation is issued when a device is retired, and
in this operation, the DID Document is updated to include the revoked attribute,
which contains a timestamp.
3.5 Devices Authentication
The authentication layer in the proposed framework provides a peer-to-peer mutual au-
thentication mechanism based on the decentralized device identity. The fundamental com-
ponent of this layer is defined by the mutual challenge-response authentication mechanism
[85]. The following assumptions are made about any two devices entering into the authen-
tication process:
1. Any device has a secure channel to the Smart Contract ABI and the DID Hub.
2. The devices can generate random numbers with enough entropy.
3. The devices are synchronized.
4. The DID document authenticity is ensured through the identity management layer.
The authentication mechanism starts when device 1 wants to establish a secure connec-
tion with device 2, and both devices (Dev1 and Dev2) want to confirm each other identity
and establish a session key to be used for cryptography operations.
Firstly, Dev1 sends a query to the DID resolver to obtain the DID Document for device
2 DDO2 which contains the public key for device 2 PK2. To mitigate for man-in-the-
middle and replay attacks Dev1 generates a random number r1 and a timestamp ts1 and
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submits a challenge composed of an encrypted message of the concatenation of id1, r1, and
ts1 using Dev2 public key.
Upon receiving the challenge by Dev2, the challenge is decrypted using Dev2 private
key SK2, checking the timestamp ts1 against the current time to ensure that it contains a
recently issued challenge. Dev2 extracts Dev1 DID id and retrieves the its DID Document
DDO1 and thus the public key PK1. Dev2 generates a random number r2 and a timestamp
ts2 and sends back an encrypted response message composed of the concatenation of id2,
r1, r2, ts2.
As Dev1 receives the original challenge r1 this proves Dev2 knowledge of the private
key and thus that DID2 belongs to it. At this point, a one-way authentication is achieved.
The third message is required, such that Dev1 returns an encrypted message containing
the challenge r2.The two devices now both have knowledge of the challenges r1 and r2 and
proved ownership of the private keys of the DIDs retrieved from the DID Hub and thus
are both mutually authenticated.
For establishing the session encryption key (Ks), both devices use Hashed Message
Authentication Code (HMAC)-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) to generate the
secret session key that is used for further communication. The key generation function
is based on SHA-256 hashing function with 256 bits key length (keyl) according to the
NIST recommendations on the usage of key derivation functions [86]. The HKDF uses the
concatenation of the two challenges as an initial string of bits and a salt of length identical
to the hashing function width, as in Equation 3.6.
Ks = HKDF (r1||r2, salt, keyl) (3.6)
64
Figure 3.10: P2P IoT Device Mutual Authentication Sequence Diagram.
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3.5.1 Device Authentication Attacks Analysis
The strength of the proposed authentication scheme is based on the strength of the used
encryption protocol. To provide analysis on the immunity of the proposed authentication
and key derivation scheme the next items discuss certain possible attacks.
Impersonation Attack
In this type of attack, an adversary E can impersonate any of the two devices (Dev1
or Dev2) by claiming the identity of one of them. For such attack to be successful (E
impersonating Dev1) the adversary must be able to act on behalf of Dev1. E has the
knowledge of both DID1 and DID2, so E can query the DID Resolver and obtain DID2
DID Document to extract PK2.
For the adversary E to be able to impersonate DID1 it has to have knowledge of
DID1 private key to be able to send an encrypted message that Dev2 can verify as it was
generated by Dev1 private key.
One way for E to achieve forging the authentication messages exchanged is by com-
promising the private key of one of the devices which is not achievable if the encryption
protocol is secure. In that case, E is not able to forge the authentication messages even by
observing a large number of exchanged messages.
Replay Attack
The other way E can try to forge the authentication messages is by re-using a previously
sent authentication message, which is known as a replay attack. However, since the authen-
tication scheme uses a random number and a timestamp this renders a previous exchanges
66
message invalid by checking the validity of the timestamp. Furthermore, the re-use of a
previously exchanged message does not disclose to E the random number used for key
derivation and this limits E from establishing the session key.
Reflection Attack
In this attack, the adversary E acts in between both devices acting as Dev1 for Dev2 and
as Dev2 for Dev1. E starts the sequence by sending a valid M1 message using E private
key, and Dev2 sees this as a legitimate message and exchanges back M2 with E. The
adversary now generates message M1 directed towards Dev1 and obtains a response from
Dev1. However, both Dev1 and Dev2 have associated this exchange with E DID. If E tries
to send M1 with either Dev1 or Dev2 DIDs, then the attack fails. Since, as the counter
party retrieves the corresponding DID document, the public key extracted will not be a
match for the private key used in encryption.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, the proposed decentralized Identity and Access Management framework
has been introduced. The different layers representing the proposal were listed, and further
discussion followed to describe the identity relationship model and the details of the identity
management layer, including the flows of actions as executed in the main smart contract
and the details of the proposed W3C DID IOT method. The authentication process has
been discussed later and explained the usage of the decentralized identity to establish a
process of mutual authentication in p2p fashion between IoT devices. The next chapter
presents the usage of Blockchain tokenization to establish decentralized authorization and
accounting processes that form the last two layers in the proposed framework.
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Chapter 4
Authorization and Accounting
The identity and authentication layers of a decentralized IoT device management frame-
work were discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter extends the framework pre-
sentation by showing how smart contracts are used to implement tokens of both fungible
and non-fungible operations to realize a decentralized authorization and accounting mecha-
nisms. The proposed system is described in highlighting core functionalities in the designed
smart contracts and the sequence of authorization processes. Performance is demonstrated
based on a testbed made of off-the-shelf IoT devices.
4.1 Centralized vs. Decentralized Access Control
The authorization and access control are made of components that focus on how to au-
thorize access, and that is performed by querying, making a decision, and enforcing au-
thorization decisions against defined access policies. Those functionalities are described in
AAA frameworks by the terminology of:
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• Policy Administration Point (PAP) as the unit responsible for policies creation and
modification,
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) unit that triggers entitlement policy decisions,
• Policy Decision Point (PDP) providing the actual entitlement decisions on behalf of
the PEP, and
• Policy Information/Retrieval Point (PIP/PRP) that supplies the PDP with the in-
formation required for a decision.
Figure 4.1 depicts the flow of actions among those different points [67]. Administration
creates policies and stores it in the policies repositories. PEP is considered the main
interface where all requests are received, and then it consults with the PDP on whether
access is granted or rejected. PDP, through the PRP, requests retrieval of the access policy
document, and for metadata, it contacts the PIP for information retrieval.
Figure 4.1: The Different Components of Access Control Policy and Flow of Actions.
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The difference between a centralized and a decentralized AC model depends on the
placement of those functionalities and which entity owns and controls that policy control
point. In a decentralized approach, as proposed in this work, the procedure extends beyond
a distributed approach, which distributes the policy points among different actors in the
network yet under global supervision by the centralized authority.
A decentralized approach places, most importantly, the policy definition and decision
making under the control of the device/owner. In such a case, the envisaged architec-
ture of a decentralized access control model grants the PAP and PDP functions to the
object owner as they pertain to the points for policy creation and decision making. The
object owner defines the policies and makes them available for retrieval to a PEP, which
can be implemented inside the device or pushed to a gateway to support device resource
limitations.
4.2 Decentralized Authorization and Access Control
In the suggested framework, the central authorization authority is replaced with a set of
smart contracts deployed on Ethereum Blockchain, and the authorization and accounting
operations are handled according to the logic engraved in the smart contracts’ code. The
decentralized IoT authorization approach enables devices to grant access to each other in
a peer-to-peer fashion that is defined based on the use of the CapBAC model through
Blockchain tokenization, based on the author’s work on defining decentralized AAA IoT
architecture[87].
Devices are required to deploy smart contracts that provide the access control function
to permit decentralized service authorization. In traditional networks, access control is
performed using either role-based access control RBAC or attribute-based access control
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ABAC, and each serves certain applications and offer certain advantages. As it was de-
scribed in Chapter 2, the CapBAC provides significant advantages over other models, which
aligns with the requirement of implementing a decentralized authorization mechanism for
IoT.
The suggested decentralized framework relies on several smart contracts for access
control that each device deploys on the Blockchain. Each access control smart contract
provides a number of functions to enable defining the access control rules for resources and
services provided by each IoT device. The architecture also includes a registrar contract
that is used to list the different access control contracts information with metadata utilized
for resources and service discovery.
4.2.1 A Tokenized CapBAC Model
The main factors in defining a CapBAC model is that a capability token once issued to a
subject; the subject should not be able to tamper with it. Also, the token should have a
specified data structure that includes at least major fields such as the capability identifier,
the delegation rights, the access rights, the issuer, and subject identifiers and timing-related
fields. In a CapBAC model, primary functions are also defined, which includes token
creation, token revocation, and delegation function. Additionally, to accommodate the
constrained environment of IoT networks, the representation has to be light and compact.
The CapBAC model is implemented using the principle of NFT tokens by extending the
ERC721 smart contract standard to provide functionalities of CapBAC tokens generation
with features of delegation, revocation, and contextual information. The access control
smart contract is implemented on a device basis, where for any device, certain access
control roles are defined for the resources/services available and issue the required amount
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of CapBAC tokens. As a result, one access control smart contract exists for each device
with a supply of access tokens as per the rules defined for each resource. In the proposed
architecture, to enable dynamic management, the main template for the access control
smart contract includes a set of management functions (ABIs):
• issueTokens(): is used to generate new tokens by the device owner when a new
resource is available, or a new policy is required.
• revokeTokens(): enables access tokens deletion as an existing policy becomes obsolete
or the resource is not available.
• obtainToken(): provides the interface for any requesting device to be granted access
by obtaining the CapBAC token issued by the device owner.
• destroyContract(): it provides a tool to disable the access control smart contract on
the Blockchain and disables generating any new tokens.
Upon a successful device-to-device mutual authentication, a subject device issues an
access request for an advertised resource to the access control smart contract. That is
handled by having the subject device issuing a call to obtainToken ABI. The function upon
success issues a new NFT access token and transfer the token ownership to the subject
device. Upon obtaining the token, the device then can access the resource according to the
access control rule defined within the token. The PEP functionality, deployed either within
the device or a gateway, can query the access control smart contract upon receiving access
requests. The smart contract, in this case, is providing the PAP functionality as set by the
rules defined in each specific token. In case of failure, the requesting device negotiates with
the offering device to amend the authorization rules and generate a token with the desired
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access rights. The object device through the management ABI issueTokens generates new
tokens or deletes obsolete ones and to ensure only the authorized device/owner can access
the management ABIs, each of those functions are restricted in access based on a set of
modifiers.
4.3 Accounting Layer
The main application of Blockchain is cryptocurrency, and Ethereum is one of the plat-
forms that offers the capability to create a cryptocurrency for entities to use as a trans-
actional mean. The Ethereum ERC20 token standard is a feasible tool to introduce a
means of transaction between IoT devices once authorization is granted. The logging and
immutability features of Blockchain provide a tool to enable the accounting functionality
in a decentralized AAA framework. Thus, this framework introduces a special token that
is utilized by the IoT devices to charge for resource usage. The concept of a token has
been used for many decentralized applications, including IoT, and a similar approach is
followed here with a focus on AAA functionality to support the accounting capability.
The token contract is based on the ERC20 token standard with an addition of a top-up
function that will allow a device balance to be topped up to be able to perform transactions
with other devices. The device owner usually calls this function through an external
interface. The ERC20 contract provides an interface for the ERC721 to charge subjects
for granting access tokens based on the defined cost. The accounting model used in this
framework is a pre-paid model, where based on the defined set of access rights requested
for the access token (either per resource or time) the object device upon access token
generation will set the price.
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4.4 Smart Contracts Design
In designing of authorization smart contracts implementation, it is required to address the
IoT context and list the main requirements to fulfill a decentralized AAA functionality,
and those can be described as:
• Full control of devices and owners on policy rules creation/revocation.
• The need to offload AAA management functions out of the constrained IoT devices
with the least minimal external authority control.
• The capability to revoke any access rights in a dynamic arrangement and to easily
delegate rights with full auditing on resource access.
• The capability to support usage of time-based access tokens that can support spon-
taneous as well as long-lived connections.
The implementation is based on the DID Documents and two smart contracts handling
the mechanisms of discovery, access control and accounting. The advertising and discovery
of deployed access control contracts are accomplished through the service field in the DID
Document, which lists the access control smart contracts associated with a device.
A registrar smart contract is used to enable devices and owners to publish their newly
deployed access control smart contracts. The registrar contract represents a repository
for the information of available resources and to obtain information on access control
smart contract addresses. The registrar contract is used as a replacement of the DID
Documents to enable a decentralized authorization layer even in the case of the absence of
DID Documents.
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The second set is the core of the decentralized access control, where it includes the
authorization logic. Specifically, the access control smart contract consists of the PAP,
PRP, and PIP functionalities. In contrast, the PEP functionality implementation is left
as an application that can reside either in the IoT device or on a gateway that controls
few devices. The PEP application has interfaces with the access control smart contract as
per the standardized interfaces, including PEP-PDP and PEP-PIP. The third set is the
ERC20 token smart contract that provides the mechanism of accounting, which includes
the functions to transfer a defined amount of the billing token in return for obtaining an
access control token.
4.4.1 Registrar Smart Contract
The primary function of this part is to allow subjects to discover available resources,
specifically the access control smart contract and the information of available resources.
It is designed with the assumption that an operating entity handles the smart contract
management; in terms of adding a registrant or authorizing features. The registrar contract
contains a data structure that holds records of registrants and the information about
available resources, policies, and addresses of access control contracts deployed. The data
structure includes three main identifiers: the registrant is identified by the global identifier
based on the Blockchain identity, the unique policy identifier to identify policies, and the
access control smart contract by the Blockchain address.
4.4.2 Access Control Smart Contract
This smart contract is designed as a set of templates that a device based on the scenario can
select to deploy a specific template to serve a particular access control scenario. The access
75
control smart contract utilizes the principle of NFT tokens, where capability-based access
tokens are defined as an NFT token that is unequivocal and manageable. The skeleton of
the access control smart contracts inherits the functions defined by the ERC721 standard
including tokenGeneration, tokenRevocation, tokenOwnership and tokensBalance.
CapBAC NFT Access Token
The access control smart contract utilizes the NFT token concept to represent the CapBAC
access token. The token structure, as in Figure 4.2, is defined in JSON format to provide
a compact representation and allow easy integration with the underlying communication
protocol. A number of fields described hereafter defines the structure of the CapBAC
token:
• Token ID: this is a unique identifier of the token, which is composed of hashing three
other identifiers, subject ID, object ID, and resource URI.
• Token Name: this field is a descriptive field to be human-readable.
• Subject ID: this ID is represented by either the device or user ID, and it represents
the token holder.
• Object ID: this is the ID of the object to be accessed.
• Owner ID: this field manages token ownership and also used in delegation confirma-
tion. Different values of Owner ID and Subject ID show that token access rights have
been delegated.
• Resource URI: a string representing the resource to be accessed as per the commu-
nication protocol.
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• Issue Time: a timestamp for when a token is issued to the subject.
• Expiry Time: a timestamp for when a token and access right granted expires.
• ValidFrom: a timestamp indicating when a token is valid. This field should always
be greater than Issue Time.
• ValidUntil: a timestamp indicating until when this token is valid. This field should
be less than Expiry Time. Both fields are used by the token holder to delegate access
rights for a limited time.
• Value: It represents the amount defined by the resource owner to offer the defined
access rights.
• Control Flags: A number of flags used to handle token management and represent
validation on whether a token can be delegated, transferred, or if it has been revoked.
• Access Rights: a field describing the actions according to the CoAP protocol GET,
FETCH, PUT, UPDATE, PATCH, and DELETE.
• Constraints: this field is made of zero or more entries to define granular access
rights, and it currently supports merging contextual information either by ANDing
or ORing. The entries should have those subfields:
Type: the contextual condition type such as location, battery level.
Condition: control condition on access right (e.g. >,<,= )
Value: to define the desired value for condition verification.
• Token Digest: a hashed value of the token JSON document that is used to protect
against usage of forged tokens.
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Figure 4.2: Non-Fungible Capability-based Token Structure.
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4.4.3 Accounting Smart Contract
The functionality of accounting is performed using a simplified pre-paid usage model im-
plemented using an ERC20 token. The token is used to represent the value of transactions
involving obtaining a CapBAC token or to charge for a delegation right. Such an approach
provides the entities participating in the authorization step the autonomy needed to price
the services offered and flexibility in providing services to the different actors interested.
The implemented accounting tokens is a straightforward translation of the ERC20 stan-
dard with uncapped total supply and one additional function, which is the top-up function
to allow any device/owner to top-up its account balance that is tied to the total supply.
The accounting smart contract design defines an assumption that minting new accounting
token is linked to an external crypto or fiat currency. The ERC20 main functions are
mapped to specific usages in the accounting mechanism as per the following:
• balanceOf(): The function is called by the access control smart contract when a
device requests to obtain a CapBAC Token to check sufficient balance.
• transferFrom(): the main function used whenever a CapBAC token issued to transfer
the corresponding value of the token from the requester to the issuer.
• Transfer(): It is also used for crediting against CapBAC tokens issuance as well in
funding device accounts by the owner.
• Approve(): offers the device owner the ability to grant a device a certain balance to
be used for transacting. Yet, the accounting token is still under the authority of the
owner, and this balance can be updated at any time.
• Allownace(): provides the same functionality of balanceOf() but for tokens available
and approved by the owner to the device.
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The accounting smart contract implements the events to record the transactions in-
volving a token transfer and approve as well as the minting transactions; therefore, all
accounting information is registered and accessible for auditing purposes.
4.5 Authorization Process
The authorization sequence diagram, Figure 4.3, shows the steps in a device-to-device au-
thorization process. The requesting device sends an access request to the device where the
resource/object exists; with no access token the object device redirects the requester to
the address of the deployed access control smart contract. The requester issues a transac-
tion to the smart contract address to obtain a token, which triggers the smart contract to
generate a token with the specified arguments, define the value associated, and charge the
requester by calling the ERC20 accounting contract.
Upon a successful transaction, the issued token is forwarded to the requesting device.
Henceforth, and based on the expiry period of the access token, the requester starts issuing
access commands (GET, PUT, . . . etc) that pass through the PEP point, which in this
diagram is represented by the gateway.
The gateway performs the policy enforcement role, as most decision factors are already
embedded in the access token. The only calls need to be made to the access control
smart contract is to retrieve the token hash value and check the ownership and delegated
authority on the token.
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4.6 Delegation Process
The delegation process, as per Figure 4.4, describes how the CapBAC token design provides
the mean for a token holder to delegate access rights to other devices. The token field
isDelegable defined by the token issuer dictates if the holder can delegate rights or not.
Once a delegate submits a delegation request the token holder (delegator) confirms the
delegation capability and then issues a transaction to the access control smart contract.
The transaction updates the fields of subject ID to match the delegate ID, define the
delegation period by setting the validFrom and ValidUntil fields and then, if required,
update the access rights and define other constraints on the delegation. The constraints
refinement can only be made to further fine the details of the permitted zone and not
to exceeded. For example, if the holder is granted UPDATE right, the delegate cannot
obtain PUT right, yet it can still be restricted only to GET operations. The revocation of
delegation is not shown in the figure above; however, it is performed by the holder issuing
a transaction to the access control smart contract to reset the Subject ID to match the
Owner ID and the validity fields to match the issue and expiry time.
4.7 Design Factors for Policy Management
4.7.1 Placement of Policy Management Functions
In the authorization steps, the different policy management functions handle the flow
to grant or deny access to a specific resource. The access control smart control hosts the
functions of PAP, PIP, and PRP, where it describes the flow of actions and map them to the
different components. This approach provides a high level of dynamicity, where CapBAC
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tokens can be generated on-demand according to a negotiated set of attributes. PAP
functionality is provided through the tokenIssuance function, which creates the CapBAC
token with the set of attributes defined by the issuer. The PRP function is offered by
the capability to query the available CapBAC tokens in a smart contract and retrieve all
details.
The PDP function is embedded in the CapBAC token itself since all parameters required
to make a decision are already compiled, and once a device presents the token and proves
the ownership access should be granted. This design allows for resource-constrained devices
to handle decentralized authorization with less burden on computing, storage, and battery
requirements as the smart contracts are hosted and executed on the Blockchain. The only
functionality that is left to be either implemented at the device or a gateway is the PEP
functionality, since any request should pass through it before access is granted. The PEP
function also has access to the smart contract to perform actions that confirm the validity
and ownership of the presented CapBAC token in any access request.
4.7.2 PEP Process Flow
The application residing on the device or the gateway handles the enforcement process
by applying a checklist to confirm the token validity and match access rules. These steps
are carried out once receiving the CoAP access command with the issued CapBAC token.
The process design opted for embedding the CapBAC token, so the PEP function is more
self-contained. The PEP process as depicted in the process chart, Figure 4.5, is a series of
checklist with a final outcome of the PEP process to be either deny access or grant access
response, those checkpoints are:
• Check against Revocation: firstly, the PEP application checks the isRevoked flag to
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handle the case of revoked tokens, and if revoked, then it replies with denied access.
• Check for Forgery: the PEP queries the token hash value from the smart contract
and compares it with the hash value of the presented token. On an unmatched event,
the PEP replies with denied access.
• Confirm Token Ownership: to ensure that the authorized token holder has issued
the request, the receiving party check both the subject ID and Owner ID. If both
fields are equal, then it is only required to check token ownership by querying the
specified interface on the smart contract. If fields have different values that show the
case of delegated access, thus again, the receiving party will confirm the ownership
and delegation rights through the smart contract.
• Check Token Validity: once more, if the token rights have been delegated, then
the gateway will check the validity of token delegation by ensuring that the current
timestamp lies between ValidFrom and ValidUntil timestamps. If the original owner
still holds the token, then the validity is checked against both Issue and Expiry
timestamps.
• Check Access Rights: by comparing the access method used in the CoAP request
received and the access right defined in the token metadata against the specified
object URI, the PEP application will either deny or grant access to the specified
resource.
• Check Constraints: Upon a successful check of access rights, the PEP application
validates the condition set in the constraints array. The application pulls the differ-
ent conditions and values defined and fuses them according to the defined operator
(OR/AND).
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Figure 4.5: Policy Enforcement Process Flow chart.
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4.8 Testbed and Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the suggested approach and highlight main issues a testbed
was built hosting an implementation of a use case of few IoT nodes providing sensor
data consumed in a p2p approach, Figure 4.6. The testbed architecture was based on 2
IoT nodes hosted on raspberry pi boards and a sense-hat shield. The testbed emulates
a group of environmental nodes providing measurements of temperature, humidity, and
barometric pressure. Each node work as an end node and as a gateway and hosts a
client and server interfaces of the CoAP protocol based on the node-coap library [88],
and interfaces to the Blockchain using the Web3.js library [89]. To emulate number of
concurrent connections, an application is installed on a laptop that uses the node-coap
library to create multiple instances of the client and issue access requests. The smart
contracts for identity management, access control, and accounting were deployed on a
private Ethereum node, and hereafter the main performance factors considered in the
analysis are discussed.
4.8.1 Timeout Ratio
Transactions on Blockchain require confirmation, and in the case of Ethereum public net-
work confirmation time is estimated at 5-20 secs. Thus, it is expected that offloading the
AAA functionalities to the smart contract will introduce latency. The CoAP confirmable
message exchange specifies default transmission parameters for message timeout and num-
ber of retries, which is used in this analysis as per section 4.8 of the CoAP standard [20].
The timeout ratio factor is measured in a scenario of one IoT device serving a resource
with several concurrent connections initiated within 30 seconds, equivalent to half the value
of the default MAX TRANSMIT SPAN value in CoAP [20]. The number of concurrent
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connections were increased from 1 to 1000 concurrent connections in steps of 1, 5, 10, 20,
50, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000.
The results, in Figure 4.7, show that for as low as 200 concurrent connections, no
timeouts were recorded. The number of timed-out requests rose slightly above 5% as the
total requests sent approaches 600 concurrent connections with a spike appearing at 800
concurrent connections represented by a timeout ratio of 16.25%, and at 1000 connections
the timeout ratio is measured at 22.1%. The author associates this sudden increase with the
fact that the CapBAC token generation step introduces significant processing delay waiting
for block confirmation, and the congestion in block production is the main attributing
factor.
Figure 4.6: Testbed Configuration.
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4.8.2 End-to-End Access Time
This parameter is the time measured from the time a device issues an access request for a
resource until it receives the response for the resource requested, encompassing all steps in
the authorization sequence diagram. Measuring the average time over 1000 runs between
two devices in a scenario of newly established connections, which require new CapBAC
token generation, shows an average value of 729ms and measuring a maximum value of
1411ms. While in the case of established connections and already issued CapBAC tokens,
the average time is at 246ms and a maximum value of 316ms.
The analysis of the authorization sequence show that the bottleneck is present the first
time the CapBAC token is generated as it requires changing the state of the smart contract.
The subsequent access requests, when the token is still valid, involve only querying the
Figure 4.7: Percentage of Timed-out Requests vs. Number of Concurrent Connections.
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Table 4.1: Average Gas Cost Per Operation
Operation Gas (GWei)
issueToken 8139
revokeToken 74
updateToken (Delegate) 276
updateToken (Undelegate) 83
transfer 1218
approve 738
smart contract for ownership and delegation information. These results show the benefit
of utilizing the NFT capability token approach to issue a self-contained policy decision
point.
4.8.3 Overhead
The proposed approach defines a capability token that the requester embeds in any request
such that it offloads the policy management functions into the smart contract and make the
capability token self-contained for policy decisions. However, that results in an overhead in
the data to be sent in each CoAP packet. According to the proposed token data structure,
the maximum length is 120 bytes, which in case of having IPv6 as the underlying protocol
(1152 packet size), [90], that represents 10.4% overhead in the data link budget.
4.8.4 Gas Cost
While the proposed framework is intended to be deployed in a permissioned Blockchain
setup where real gas is not used, Table 4.1 lists the average Gas cost for a number of
operations to work as a guideline for the design complexity. The different operations are
highlighted with the consumed Gas. Since a query function does not consume Gas, the
functions listed include only the functions that changes the chain state.
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4.9 Discussion
This section introduces a brief discussion on other factors including generality, scalability,
and governance. In terms of scalability, one concern would be in the case of a failure of a
single request for token access or delegation and how that affect the rest of interactions.
However, with the design of the flows of smart contracts it presents no dependency between
different transactions and thus one failed transaction affects only the intended operation.
The proposed token structure contains a metadata that is related to a specific subject
and resource and the only variable is the constraints section which varies based on the
policy to be imposed. This offers the advantage of having a token of fixed size that does
not increase as the number of devices increases.
In order to present the reader with the suggested IoT device hardware requirement, the
proposed framework suggested to offload many of the computation intensive operations
to the access control smart contract and the self-contained token design, however other
operations are still required to be performed by the device or gateway. Based on the
IETF RFC 7228 [91] terminologies for constrained-node networks, the proposed framework
suggests that a class 2 device capability is required for implementing the different flows
described. This device class ensures that it can accommodate for the requirements of
network connectivity by offering a memory footprint of 50 KBytes and storage capacity
of 250 KBytes.
In the case of framework generality, the framework utilizes standardized identification
schemes and standardized tokens specification making it platform agnostic. Furthermore,
since the logic is automated through smart contracts, the system can be exported to other
platforms running different consensus mechanisms. The main effort required in such case
is to rewrite the smart contract in the supported languages by the targeted platform.
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Governance is also among the topics addressed when considering deploying a Blockchain
network. The thesis work assumes that an enterprise deployment is considered and thus a
permissioned setup is needed. The setup requires that Blockchain nodes to be owned and
operated by different entities joining the network as a consortium while users and devices
can still have access to smart contract through the ABIs. Furthermore, the process of
enrolling enterprise entities in the network varies from one case to another. However, in
case of an existing managing authority, this entity will assume the role of deploying and
owning the registrar smart contract which is the approach proposed in the use cases.
4.10 Summary
Building distributed and decentralized applications on heterogeneous IoT networks require
that lower-level layers to support these operations. The IoT device management layer is
among the layers responsible for enabling a decentralized service consumption model. The
decentralized AAA functionality presented is a working solution through the utilization of
the standardized Ethereum ERC20 and ERC721 tokens.
The work defines a framework that has a foundation of decentralized identity manage-
ment and built on top of it a mutual authentication scheme. Moreover, by mapping the
CapBAC access model to the ERC721 standard, the work demonstrates how access tokens
are defined as collectibles, which can be extended to an economy of tradable and collectible
access tokens.
The testbed results show the feasibility of the approach with further investigation re-
quired to compare the performance when the same approach is implemented on top of PoS
and DPoS consensus algorithms. The data overhead issue observed in the testbed results
also requires an assessment of a trade-off between embedding the token as a whole or only
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add the token ID and perform the token retrieval at the PEP side. The latter suggestion
is also expected to suffer communication overhead as the token needs to be retrieved on
each request.
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Chapter 5
DEIR - A Decentralized Smartphone
Identity Service
This chapter introduces a use case that implements the concept of decentralized device
identity in combating smartphone device counterfeiting and theft. The use case implements
a decentralized version of the existing cellular networks equipment registry function, which
is part of the 3GPP specification. This function handles the reporting of stolen and lost
devices and ensuring that those devices are blacklisted and are not permitted for usage in
any other network. The chapter first introduces the problem at hand and describes the
current approach. Then, the suggested decentralized approach is described and compared
to the existing solution.
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5.1 Introduction
The number of smartphone devices shipped in Q3 2019 reached almost 380 million units
with the expectation of reaching around 1.4 billion devices by year-end [92]. Most of those
devices are used and connected to different mobile networks operating around the globe,
and the challenges arising are on how those devices’ identities are maintained and ver-
ified. The current approach is a centralized database maintaining the phone identifiers
and providing a mechanism for operators to host a local database registry that replicates
and pushes updates to the central registry (IMEIDB). The IMEIDB is a centralized reg-
istry hosted and operated by the Global System for Mobile Communication Association
(GSMA), which is acting as the Global Decimal Administrator (GDA) since 2004 [27].
The IMEIDB utilizes the unique IMEI identifier (International Mobile Equipment Iden-
tity) that distinguishes each device among the billions of smartphone devices manufactured.
IMEI is a 15-digit number where all digits have the range of 0 to 9 coded as a binary coded
decimal and used to identify each device on mobile networks [28]. The IMEIDB uses these
identifiers to enforce operations related to combating devices’ theft and counterfeiting as
devices can be labeled as either whitelisted, graylisted, or blacklisted. The access to the
GSMA IMEIDB is offered to the 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project) members,
including network operators, device manufacturers, and qualified industry parties. The
3GPP TS 22.016 specification defines the IMEI identifier [28], which has the structure
depicted in Figure 5.1.
IMEI numbers are composed of the three main elements divided into subsets to identify
manufacturers codes and serial numbers:
• Type Allocation Code (TAC): It has a length of 8 digits, and it represents the man-
ufacturer code with the first two digits representing the issuing authority;
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Figure 5.1: IMEI Number Format.
• Serial Number (SNR): This is an individual serial number uniquely identifying each
equipment within the TAC with a length of 6 digits;
• Check Digit (CD): The Check Digit is used as a checksum to ensure IMEI correctness,
and it is computed in a specified way as defined by the 3GPP TS 22.016 specification
[28].
5.2 Publicly Administered Smartphones Database
The smartphone industry is one among many other industries lucrative for counterfeiting
and grey markets, due to the high demand for the product and the high margin that can
be made from counterfeited products of smartphone brands such as Samsung, Huawei,
and Apple. The unique feature of smartphones is that each device has a unique identifier
called IMEI. The IMEI is a 15-digit number that is used to identify a device on a mobile
network. The mobile industry uses these identifiers to improve operations and deter theft
and counterfeiting. The IMEI’s 15 digits have the range of 0 to 9 coded as a binary coded
decimal, and it is divided into subsets to identify manufacturers’ codes and serial numbers
[27].
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The main IMEI maintained database is the IMEIDB, maintained by the Global System
for Mobile Association (GSMA). The IMEIDB is a central database under the full control
of GSMA, and it contains basic information on serial numbers, (IMEI) ranges of millions
of 3GPP devices (GSM,3G, LTE) e.g., mobile phones, laptop data cards etc. that are in
use across all 3GPP networks worldwide. GSMA handles the operation of the database
and the allocation of IMEIs to handset manufacturers to ensure that no two devices are
made with the same IMEI. The GSMA performs this role by recording a list of all IMEIs
that it has allocated in the IMEIDB. Upon assigning IMEIs to a device manufacturer,
GSMA stores some basic information associated with the IMEI. The information includes
the manufacturer name and the model identifier of the associated device and some of
its technical capabilities (e.g., frequency bands, Operating System, WLAN & Bluetooth
capability, etc.) [27].
Access to the IMEIDB is provided through GSMA, and it is limited to its members,
including network operators and manufacturers. The IMEIDB is utilized to offer blacklists
for devices that should be denied service on the network because they have been reported
as lost, stolen, faulty or otherwise unqualified for use. Part of the IMEIDB is the Central
Equipment Identify Register (CEIR), which provides a tool for network operators to share
their individual blacklists. Thus, devices denied service (blacklisted) on one network will
not work on other networks even if the SIM card in the device is changed [93].
The main purpose is to allow operators to deploy local Equipment Identity Regis-
ter (EIR) in their networks and synchronize with the CEIR to offer a global view to all
participants of blacklisted devices. According to many reports, including the Federal Com-
munications Commission’s Mobile Device Theft Prevention Working Group, IMEIDB has
been in use since 1996. Yet, a minimal effect is achieved in preventing counterfeited and
stolen devices from reaching consumers [94].
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Another type of IMEI management database is local and regional databases introduced
by regulators that did not join the GSMA due to many issues related to membership
conditions. One of the local IMEI DB is managed by the Malaysian Communications
and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) to implement a Public Cellular Blocking Service
(PCBS). A system called MCEIR is implemented with a purpose to handle the lost/stolen
devices by maintaining a central repository for the reported devices [95].
Similarly, in 2016 both the Omani and Pakistani telecommunication regulatory authori-
ties launched a service that helps consumers to find whether the mobile device a user plans
to purchase is authentic or fake within minutes through text messages. A smartphone
device must be marked with the authority name stamp, and customers can report about
counterfeit or stolen devices to regulatory authority through an email. Consequently, the
necessary action is initiated by the authority to update the local IMEI database [95].
Regional attempts to build an IMEIDB also exist. The East African Communications
Organization (EACO) is a regional organization formed from national ICT regulators,
operators, services providers in certain sub-Saharan countries that built a regional IMEIDB.
EACO effort started in 2012 to build a blacklisting IMEI database to handle counterfeited
and smuggled smartphones in the region [96].
5.3 Drawbacks of the Centralized IMEIDB
In all mentioned centralized database systems, access to the database is maintained and
controlled by an authority that grants access to the information based on a subscription
model. The subscription model is made only available to certain parties based on certain
qualifications. For example, the global GSMA IMEIDB is accessible mainly to network
operators, device manufacturers, and law enforcement agencies.
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A major drawback is the limited adoption of such a system due to the fact that access
to the information regarding device identity is limited. In the case of local or regional
databases, in addition to access restriction, the information gathered is made only available
in a limited region, though the effect of counterfeiting and theft is more global, and hence
this makes such systems ineffective.
In the case of the GSMA database, few drawbacks hinder the adoption by operators
and involved parties. The main drawback is the prohibitive membership fees, which is,
according to GSMA starts at an annual fee of $13,000 for entities with revenue between 0-50
million USD and reaches $124,000 for entities with $700 million or more in annual revenue
[97]. The high fees prohibit many operators, especially in developing countries, from joining
and connecting their EIR with the CEIR. Additionally, the supply chain of smartphones
includes many entities, e.g., recycling agents and retailers that currently cannot join the
system. The reluctance of many entities to join is evident; the map illustrated in Figure
5.2 only operators in 35 countries worldwide are connected to the IMEIDB [98].
Figure 5.2: Usage of GSMA IMEIDB Worldwide. Source: GSMA
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Another drawback is the slow and manual process, where the IMEIDB is accessible
only through service providers and law agencies for reporting lost or stolen devices, and
the main reason is because of the lack of trust and proving the ownership of the device
by the reporter. Thus, reporting a stolen device requires days and weeks to be populated
and reflected in the system and then replicated to other operators’ EIRs. This manual
process forms a gap that allows thieves and fraudsters with the capability of using those
supposedly blacklisted devices in different networks and territories. This issue also has
been reported by the FCC Technological Advisory Council (TAC) Mobile Device Theft
Prevention (MDTP) Working Group as one of the tools used in organized crimes and
trafficking [94].
By the end of 2018, among the 1250 mobile operators worldwide, only 119 operators
have joined the GSMA IMEIDB [98]. This number represents approximately 21% of the
total number of operators worldwide participating in providing information and utilizing
the GSMA IMEIDB to combat a problem amounting to losses estimated at 45.3 billion
EUR and among the main reasons for lack of adoption is the centralized approach used
[99]. The author, therefore, proposes that a decentralized scheme built on trust granted to
the end-user and all parties can help in increasing the adoption rate, enhancing the speed
Figure 5.3: Current Effect of the Centralized IMEIDB
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of information propagation among all parties, and providing ease of access.
The effects of devices’ theft and counterfeiting include financial loss to the manufacturer,
deterioration of service level and extends to other security and privacy concerns linked for
example to the SIM swapping problem and the possible consequences of thieves to obtain
access to users login information in financial services, social platforms, and many others.
Fraudulent activities based on counterfeiting and theft rely mostly on the hardship for
information dissemination among all parties involved in the supply chain and the lack of
visibility on the device identity throughout its life cycle.
In this use case, the framework of decentralized identity and DID identifiers is applied as
a solution for smartphone counterfeiting and stolen devices. The use case defines a solution
for establishing a unique and global digital identity that can be maintained throughout the
smartphone life cycle.
The use case proposes utilizing the IMEI as a unique and global digital identity to
support device ownership management and identity update that enable the consumer to
have more control over the device and all the attached services. This approach provides
a tool for consumers, distributors, network operators, IP protection agencies and device
manufacturers to combat the issues of mobile phone theft and counterfeiting and enhance
the mechanism for reporting stolen phones and make it more accessible to the end-user.
5.4 3GPP Related Specification
The IMEIDB solution is based on a Central Equipment Identity Register CEIR, and local
Equipment Identity Registers EIRs, where the CEIR is hosted and maintained by the
GSMA and any operator connected need to maintain a local EIR. The Equipment Identity
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Register (EIR) is a cellular network entity that stores lists of the IMEI numbers, with a
one-to-one mapping to physical devices. The IMEI is used to identify the actual handset
and is not dependent upon the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), which is
used to uniquely identifies every user of a cellular network and linked to the SIM card [28].
The EIRs function of combating theft and counterfeiting of devices is done by comparing
the queried IMEI during handset registration to the cellular network against three lists
provided by the network operator:
• Blacklist - Devices of the Blacklist are denied access to the network
• Graylist - Devices on the Graylist are allowed on the network, but may be tracked.
• Whitelist - Devices on the Whitelist are allowed access to the network.
The use of IMEIDB is based on the unique IMEI identifier that is checked against black
and white lists. This process is governed through a number of 3GPP related standards
that define the components used in the operator network to maintain those lists and pro-
vide the required interfaces to interact with other network elements. EIR is connected to
other components over the S13 and S13’ interfaces. These two interfaces connect the EIR
towards both the Mobility Management Entity (MME) and the Serving GPRS Support
Node (SGSN), respectively, which handles devices registration and allocation of services,
both voice and data [100].
Figure 5.4 below shows the different components in the core network of a mobile net-
work and how the EIR is connected to other components. According to the 3GPP 22.016
specification [28], the EIR performs the procedure as defined by the two commands ME-
Identity-Check-Request/Answer (ECR/ECA). The ME Identity check procedure is exe-
cuted between the MME and the EIR, and between the SSGN and the EIR.
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Figure 5.4: EIR in LTE Networks
Once the MME and SSGN are configured to use the EIR, they start performing the
registration procedure by sending first the ME-Identity-Check-Request with certain infor-
mation elements that include IMEI as a mandatory field and IMSI as an optional field. The
EIR responds with the ME-Identity-Check-Answer that includes two information elements.
The result code indicates if successful or if there is an error. The other information element
is the equipment-status, which is only included if the result of the ME Identity Check is
flagged as successful. For the EIR to be in synchronization with IMEIDB, the northbound
interface for EIR is linked to the CEIR, which is an SFTP-based interface according to the
GSMA SG.18 IMEI database file format specification [27].
5.4.1 EIR in 5G
EIR as component continues to exist in 5G networks (known as 5G-EIR) with interfaces
to the 5G network components replacing the functionality of both MME and SGSN. As
diameter interfaces are replaced by RESTful APIs (Application Programming Interface) in
5G, the S13 and S13’ are both defined in 5G using RESTful API endpoints. The interface
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to the 5G-EIR has a reference point N17 for interaction between the 5G-EIR and the AMF
(Access and Mobility Management Function) that replaces MME function in LTE (Long
Term Evolution) networks [101].
The 5G-EIR API endpoint named N5g-eir EquipmentIdentityCheck is consumed by
AMF to check the Permanent Equipment Identifier - PEI (a general term for IMEI and
other possible identifiers in 5G) and check if the PEI is in the blacklist. The procedure in
5G is based on HTTP RESTful API calls [101].
1. The AMF issues an API GET request to the resource representing the PEI equipment
Status. The call parameters include the PEI as a mandatory parameter and the SUPI
as optional (SUPI can be the IMSI)
2. If successful, a response code of 200 is received along with the message body contain-
ing the equipment status of the PEI.
3. ”404 Not Found” error code is received with the ”details” attribute set to ”ER-
ROR EQUIPMENT UNKNOWN”.
4. The AMF based on the PEI status will send either a Registration Reject if the 5G-EIR
indicates that the PEI is unknown or blacklisted or accept if it is in the whitelist.
Figure 5.5: EIR Interface in 5G Networks
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5.5 Decentralized IMEIDB
The proposed solution is based on developing a blockchain-based Decentralized EIR (DEIR).
The DEIR is a 3GPP standard-compliant as it is assumed to be substituting the current
EIR implementation and maintaining all standard interfaces to other network elements
(e.g., AMF, MME, and SGSN).
The solution, as per the proposed decentralized identity management framework in
Chapter 3, utilizes the decentralized identifiers and verifiable credentials specifications to
provide the identity layer required to enable trust among the different parties involved
[102, 103].
The solution is implemented using Ethereum as the Blockchain technology and the
ETHR-DID method specification developed by the uPort team, [57], with extensions de-
veloped by the author to accommodate the specific details of the use case.
5.5.1 System Architecture and Operations Flow
The proposed system architecture is composed of a DID Hub for DID Documents storage;
the hub provides means for storing generated DID Documents and making it accessible.
The DEIR which replaces the EIR functionality and implements the smart contracts for
identity management. The other component of the architecture is the IMEI DID method,
which is an extension of the ETHR-DID method. As for any DID method, a DID resolver
also is an integral part of enabling resolving the DID to the corresponding DID Document.
The system architecture in Figure 5.6 depicts the different components and stakeholders
and describes different action flows. For identity creation, marked by hard lines, the flow
shows the steps required to create and register a DID and store the corresponding DID
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Figure 5.6: System Architecture and Operations Flow
Document using on-chain and off-chain storage capability.
1. The first step creates the DID, which does not require interaction with the Blockchain
as the manufacturer creates a pair of Ethereum keys and use the Ethereum address
to construct the DID.
2. Upon device assignment through sale, the DID document gets created according to
Listing 5.1. The owner DID can be based on other DID Hub for individuals identities
such as uPort [57]. The DID Document is submitted to the DID manager.
3. The DID manager performs the necessary verification’s through pulling required ver-
ifiable credentials. The smart contract registers the DID Document and stores it in
the Blockchain.
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The flow also highlights the transfer of ownership flow, which is initiated by the owner,
verified by the DID manager through querying the DID Hub for the corresponding DID
Document and any associated verifiable credential, including current proof of ownership.
The process final step is represented by updating the DID document to reflect the transfer
of ownership event using the owner field and generate a new proof of ownership for the
new owner. The structure of the used verifiable credentials is presented later.
5.5.2 Smart Contract and IMEI DID Methods Details
The implementation details are based on the two smart contracts: the Registrar and the
DID Manager. Additionally, the use case defines a specific DID method to support the
features required by the IMEIDB, which are described hereafter.
IMEIDB DID Method
In this use case, the main DID methods for CRUD operations (Create, Read, Update,
Delete/Revoke) are extended to include other methods that fulfill the need for IMEIDB
DID documents verification and ownership management. The four main methods are
a straight forward implementation of the DID methods to create a DID and associated
document, to retrieve and verify a DID document, to update a DID document attributes,
and to revoke a DID. The added methods include change of ownership, verify ownership,
report a stolen/lost device, and blacklist/whitelist a device.
Based on the ETHR DID method specification, each DID is based on an Ethereum
address as a fully self-managed DID, which provides the feature of better integration and
scalability. The proposed format of DID identifier is using the Ethereum address of an en-
tity in addition to the prefix ’imeidb’ to construct a DID, e.g., ”did:imeidb:0x2dE5...A8Be”.
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imeidb− did = ”did : imeidb : ”EtherAddress (5.1)
5.5.3 IMEIDB Verifiable Credentials
Similar to a DID Document, the verifiable credential (VC) is a JSON-LD Document that
contains claims about an identity [61]. In the smartphone identity system, a VC is a proof
that an individual has ownership of a device. In ensuring that a VC authentic, a digital
signature is employed. The digital signature is constructed for the contained metadata for
the claim represented, and this is contained in the field ’proof’. In the case of a proof of
ownership claim, it includes the DID of the device, a timestamp of when it was issued (can
also include an expiry date for the claim). Most importantly, the claim object includes the
DID of the claim’s subject represented by the field ”credentialSubject”.
{
"@context ": "https :// w3id.org/credentials/v1",
"id": "did:imeidb :0xd0 ...2b",
"type": [" VerifiableCredential", "ProofOwnership "],
"credentialSubject ": {
"id": "did:ethr:0xeb ..21"
},
"proof ": {
"type": "Ed25519Signature2018",
"created ": "2019 -05 -10 T17 :43:35Z",
"issuer ": "did:ethr:0x25..4f#key -1",
"domain ": "imeidb",
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"nonce ": "1b..h6",
"signatureValue ": "4v3cT ...Du+Bg=="
}
}
Other verifiable credential types used include device whitelisting/blacklisting to miti-
gate for stolen devices incidents. The structure of the claim includes the fields of issued
time, incident info, and the proof field; the proof field must include a signature generated
by the private key of the owner. Any entity can confirm the legitimacy of the claim by
verifying the signature using the owner’s public key in addition to pulling the proof of
ownership claim and verifying it against the issuer signature. In the last case, the creden-
tial subject field is not required since the claim is about the DID of the device, which is
represented by the ”id” field.
The entire credential object is hashed and signed by the issuer, which constructs a two-
part VC: the claim metadata and the proof of authenticity represented by the signature.
{
"@context ": "https :// w3id.org/credentials/v1",
"id": "did:imeidb :0xd0 ...2b",
"type": [" VerifiableCredential", "ClaimofLostDevice "],
"incident ": {
"title ": "text description",
"loc": {
"@type ": "GeoCoordinates",
"latitude ": "29.33" ,
"longitude ": " -41.18"
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},
"carrierid ": "did:ethr:0xb8 ...f6"
}
"proof ": {
"type": "Ed25519Signature2018",
"created ": "2019 -05 -10 T19 :05:17Z",
"issuer ": "did:ethr:0x25..4f#owner",
"domain ": "imeidb",
"nonce ": "2h..d5",
"signatureValue ": "4kgk6 ... rQMY =="
}
}
5.5.4 DEIR Smart Contract Implementation
On top of the DID layer, the use case implementation includes two smart contracts to
handle two streams of operations. The first stream includes operations related to manu-
facturers’ registration, query, and assignment of unique Type Allocation Codes TAC and
the second is related to the operations for device identity issuance, transfer of ownership,
and verification of claims.
Registrar Smart Contract
The Registrar smart contract is responsible for maintaining the entities registration in-
cluding functions related to issuing entities DIDs, providing and authorizing access to the
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registry for creating and updating devices DIDs, and implementing a mechanism to gen-
erate a unique IMEI through establishing a method for assigning vendor code and TACs
and ensuring their uniqueness.
Since the DID creation step is based on the Ethereum address, it requires no interaction
with the smart contract. However, this step requires first to generate the DID document.
The DID Document for any registered entity contains in its minimal format the fields of
context, id, publicKey, and authentication.
However, the suggested extra fields are required to fulfill the proposed functionality,
which are: type - to differentiate between entities and devices DID documents, vendorCode
- which is assigned by the registrar smart contract. Other optional fields include created
and updated fields that are timestamps for the time of creation and latest update and used
for tracing and auditing capability.
{
"@context ": "https :// w3id.org/did/v1",
"id": "did:imeidb :0x2dE5 ... A8Be",
"publicKey ": [{
id: ’did:imeidb :0x2dE5 ... A8Be#owner ’,
type: ’Secp256k1VerificationKey2018 ’,
owner: ’did:ethr:0x2dE5 ...A8Be ’,
ethereumAddress: ’0x2dE5 ...A8Be ’}],
"authentication ": [{
type: ’Secp256k1SignatureAuthentication2018 ’,
publicKey: ’did:imeidb :0x2dE5 ... A8Be#owner ’}],
"type": "entity",
"vendorCode ": "23",
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"created ": "2019 -05 -10 T17 :22:36Z",
"updated ": "2019 -05 -10 T17 :22:36Z"
}
In the current governance model, it is assumed that the GSMA is handling the entities
registration, the Registrar smart contract include the functions that allow a managing
authority to perform adding entities and generate entity DID. Other functionalities, also
allow the managing authority to assign a delegate to manage the smart contract functions.
These functions are among of the requirements by the GSMA specifications, where regional
and other delegated entities exist.
The smart contract includes few modifiers that control access to certain functions,
including ensuring that entities’ generation is permitted for only the managing authority
and delegated entities. Another modifier exists to ensure that only authorized entities are
allowed to generate new device DIDs.
contract Registrar {
address main_registrar;
struct delegate {
address ea;
uint8 privileges;
}
mapping (address => delegate) delegates;
struct entity {
address ea;
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bytes32 name;
bytes16 country;
bytes16 vendorCode;
uint8 tac;
}
mapping (address => entity) entities;
Constructor {
main_registrar = msg.sender;
}
modifier onlyMainRegisrar (){
require(msg.sender == main_registrar);
_;
}
modifier onlyDelegates (){
require(msg.sender == delegates[msg.sender ].ea);
_;
}
modifier onlyRegisteredEntities (){
require(msg.sender == entities[msg.sender ].ea);
_;
}
...
}
Listing 5.1: Manufacturer Registrar Smart Contract Modifiers
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To eliminate the managing authority, the registrar contract can utilize other DID Hubs
to verify the identity of any entity. For example, the VON (Verifiable Organizations Net-
work) DID hub deployed recently by the government of British Columbia can be used to
verify claims presented by an identity as either a device manufacturer or an operator [104].
Device Registry Smart Contract
The device registry smart contract provides an open global registry used to store the
unique cryptographically generated DID, where each DID is pointing to a DID document
generated by the manufacturer for each device using IMEI in the id attributes. The
transfer of ownership operation of the devices is maintained in the global registry so that
an auditing trail exist for all transfer events since device manufacturing date.
In this proposal, it is suggested to use an owner attribute to provide the device owner
the capability to perform operations on the device DID document and access to DID
methods. The owner attribute is an array of at least two entries, the first entry is the
device publicKey and the other entries list the device actors publicKeys, where at least
one public representing the device owner need to exist.
Since loss of key pairs can render the DID useless, then a backup key or a delegated
account key should exist to ensure that the DID methods are accessible. This is a design
decision that can be enforced through the ob-boarding business process by instructing the
owner to generate a backup key pair.
The device registry smart contract contains the functions for identity creation, transfer
of ownership and also update device status in case of reporting a lost or stolen phone. These
functions have access control mechanism based on the different modifiers implemented in
both this contract and the Registrar contract. Listings show that the creation function is
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limited in access to only authorized identity through the onlyRegisteredEntities modifier,
while the transfer of ownership and update device status is controlled by the onlyOwner
modifier.
Algorithm 2: DID Creation
Input: imei, publicKey, [attributes ...]
Result: DID Created
if onlyRegisteredEntity(senderAddress) & imei exists then
DDO ⇐ generateDIDDocument (imei, publicKey, [attributes...]);
dids[imei] ⇐ senderAddress;
logEvent(senderAddress, imei, DID, timestamp);
else
Ignore;
end
With such a level of control on identity generation, the root of trust is established, and
ultimately the device owner has full control over the device identity. Table 5.1 lists the
different identity operations and how that builds a root of trust that offers the end-user
authenticated access to the operation of reporting device loss and theft
5.5.5 DEIR Interaction in 3GPP Network
The proposed solution is not considered to be a complete replacement for the IMEIDB
but rather to decentralize the EIR functionality while maintaining all standardized 3GPP
specification [100].
The DEIR is offering interfaces to interact with the two system components (MME and
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SGSN), also providing an API endpoint to interface with external actors (manufacturers,
operators, user owners). The message flow described here has three flows, MME-to-DEIR,
SGSN-to-DEIR, User-to-DEIR. Since the S13 and S13’ interfaces carry messages in Diam-
eter protocol format once issued and anticipated by the MME and SGSN, thus a Diameter
to DEIR adapter is used. The adapter encodes and decodes the ECR and ECA message
formats and extracts the main parameters (mainly IMEI) to query the ledger state.
• IMEI Check Request
The sequence below, Figure 5.7, describes the message exchange flow as a device
UE submits a registration request to the network. Once a registration request is
received, and depending on whether this is a voice or a data connection, the MME or
the SGSN creates a ME-Identity-Check-Request formatted as an ECR message and
submits the request to the DEIR.
The DEIR smart contract for identity management extracts the IMEI and queries
the blacklist state. If a verifiable credential for the specific IMEI is found, then
Table 5.1: Identity Operations Root of Trust Establishment.
Actor Role Accessible Operation Trust Source
Managing Au-
thority (GSMA)
Main Reg-
istrar
Generate Delegates and
Entities Identities
Default Authority &
Contract Creator
Regional Office
or Appointed
Parties
Delegate Generate Entities Identi-
ties
Main Registrar
Manufacturer &
Operators
Entity Generate Devices Identities Main Registrar or Del-
egates
User Device
Owner
Manage Devices Identities Manufacturers & Op-
erators
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Figure 5.7: IMEI Check Request Process Flow
the DEIR returns the ME-Identity-Check-Answer (ECA message). Consequently,
the MME/SGSN, as it receives a reply with confirmation that the IMEI is in the
blacklist, it rejects the connection. If the response shows that the IMEI is either
whitelisted or graylisted, the registration process continues as in the normal flow.
• Device Status Update Request
The device status update request is issued through a DEIR API endpoint as a device
has to be reported as stolen or lost and thus updating the blacklist. The process
starts by the user submitting a device status update request (e.g., reporting it as
stolen) with an attached VC.
The API server receives the call, formats a request, and submits it to the Identity
Manager smart contract. The smart contract confirms that the issuer is authorized
and updates the associated record. If successful, the ledger state is updated, and the
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event is logged for auditing purposes. The same flow is used once the owner or an
authorized provider wants to revert the blacklisting.
Algorithm 3: Device Status Update
Input: imei, statusUpdate
Result: IMEI Record Updated
if onlyOwner(senderAddress) & imei exists then
imeiRecord[imei] ⇐ statusUpdate
logEvent(senderAddress, imei, statusUpdate, timestamp)
else
Ignore;
end
Figure 5.8: IMEI Status Update Request Process Flow
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5.6 Summary
The presented use case shows how a decentralized identity management framework can
facilitate network operations to solve issues such as counterfeiting and lost and stolen
devices. The question addressed has a very high economic, technical, and legal effect and
the currently used approach while it has proven to help to combat the problem it still lacks
in certain aspects.
The proposed decentralized approach for managing smartphone identities in the IMEIDB
provides advantages in terms of cutting costs, minimize the propagation time of the in-
formation and ensure easy and global access, Figure 5.9 shows a comparison for these
indicators. The use case is a demonstration of the concept of decentralized identity de-
ployed in a private network, and the author’s work has been recognized and adopted by
Figure 5.9: Decentralized vs. Centralized IMEIDB
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the Linux Foundation and the Hyperledger Project. The use case is a work in progress to
be extended by the IoT subgroup in the Linux Foundation Telecom Special Interest Group
to be implemented on top of the Hyperledger Fabric and Hyperledger Indy DLTs to test
the system in a permissioned DLT setup [105].
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Chapter 6
Secure Anti-Counterfeiting
Pharmaceuticals Supply Chain
System Using Composable
Non-Fungible Tokens
This chapter addresses another use case where Blockchain tokenization is applied in one of
the IoT applications, which is supply chain management. Management of the supply chain
systems is addressed by the use of IoT devices, such as the use of electronic tags to stream-
line the processes of monitoring, tracking, and authenticating. The use case addresses a
specific challenge in the pharmaceutical supply chain system imposed by recently intro-
duced regulatory frameworks related to tracing and tracking. This chapter first introduces
the targeted domain, then highlights Blockchain usage, and later presents the proposed
solution.
121
6.1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical companies and other parties involved in the drug supply chain face dif-
ficulties meeting the traceability requirements from the regulatory bodies in different ju-
risdictions and provide the capability to authenticate goods and drugs, which results in
failure to combat major issues such as drugs counterfeiting [106].
Moreover, the drug supply chain is highly fragmented, and that prohibits establishing a
global view on handling drug packages from manufacturing till reaching the customer with
many loopholes that permit the introduction of counterfeit products that patients cannot
authenticate. The recently introduced regulations in the US and EU aim at building
electronic systems to enable tracing of drugs. Those regulations focus mainly on attaching
a 2D barcode for identification. However, applying these regulations and ensuring having
a global view and perseverance of records and actions is not yet addressed [107].
The pharmaceutical industry has one of the most complex supply chain systems; it
includes different stakeholders such as manufacturers, distributors and pharmacies and
with many overlooking bodies. The security of the supply chain in the pharmaceutical
industry is considered very important where a breach in the chain can cause failure in
delivering the required health service that has a direct impact on patients’ health and life.
A prominent issue in the pharmaceutical industry is drug counterfeiting. The impact of
counterfeit, substandard, and grey market medicines is estimated to account for $75 to $200
billion yearly, and in particular developing countries, this represents 50% of all drugs sold
[108]. In sub-Saharan Africa, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that around
116,000 people die yearly due to ineffective malaria medication [109]. Counterfeit and
substandard medicines are contributing to hundreds of millions of extra costs in healthcare
systems, due to the failure to treat patients right at the first time.
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The two main reasons for drug counterfeiting are the high margin that can be gained
and also the loose supply chain system in the pharmaceutical industry. The drug bottle
or container changes ownership from manufacturer to wholesaler, distributor, and then
pharmacist before it reaches the patient.
The issue of tracking and verifying genuine products is even more laborious once it
reaches the retailer and pharmacy and enters into what is known as the post supply chain.
For example, in post supply chain, manufacturers have limited or zero knowledge about
their products, and a drug recall notification usually does not reach the end patient directly.
6.2 Supply Chain in Pharmaceuticals
Supply chain management systems in the pharmaceutical industry are one of the most
sophisticated and sensitive verticals. It contains different streams and also many partic-
ipants. The chain starts with drug manufacturers that can be brand manufacturers or
generic manufacturer, where the later focus on manufacturing generic compounds that are
used by other manufacturers. In Pharmaceuticals, the distribution of drugs is managed
mostly by manufacturers starting from the production site to the drug wholesalers and, in
some cases, even to dispensers, especially for hospitals [110].
Another stream in the drug supply chain includes the direct distribution between man-
ufacturers and governments’ agencies, especially in vaccines and drugs falling under specific
assistance programs. The last segment in the drug supply chain is called the post supply
chain, and it is the segment between the retailer (e.g., pharmacy) and the end customer
(patient). This segment lacks better tracing and tracking capabilities and suffers the most
from the risk of an increase in counterfeit and altered products to reach end customers
[110].
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6.2.1 Regulatory Environment
The pattern of how technology is used in the drug supply chain has been heavily driven
by the tight regulations and policies imposed. The most recent developed regulations in
the US and EU are bringing potential implications and introduce the need for smart and
intelligent packaging and require an increasing usage of distributed, connected, and trusted
technologies to meet the requirements of tracing, visibility and compliance.
Technological efforts focused more on introducing sensing technologies and the use
of the RFID and NFC tags to provide the feature of electronically reading the unique
identifiers of each package. The tracing and tracking requirements are streamlined using
RFID and NFC tags, however cloning of these tags can still take place, and counterfeit
and substandard products still reach end customers. However, ensuring one global view
and boosting the level of trust among the different stakeholders is still an issue in addition
to the lack of interoperability and capability of disseminating events between the adopted
systems utilizing different standards.
Many industry bodies identify that healthcare supply chain systems to have five pain
points, including:
• Visibility: which pertains to the capability of having global view on the products
from manufacturing till the end customer.
• Traceability: and it relates to the capability to monitor products, their associated
events, through the supply chain, and metadata associated with any product
• Flexibility: considering the example of a recall this pain point addresses how effi-
cient and adaptable a supply chain system to abrupt events and issues, with the least
operational costs.
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• Compliance: to ensure adherence to the standards and policies imposed by regula-
tory authorities, specifically in relation to traceability and anti-counterfeiting.
• Governance: in the case of healthcare supply chain system with many different
stakeholders managing the stakeholder relationship and building the required trust
among the involved parties to reduce risks and streamline the process is a significant
hurdle.
In combating these issues, the regulatory bodies introduced compliance policies such
as the Falsified Medicines Directive (FMD) in the European Union [111] and Drug Sup-
ply Chain Security Act (DSCSA) in the US [112]. The aim is to build an interoperable
electronic system to define a unique identifier for each sealable drugs lot, package or unit
and enable tracing and tracking of prescription drugs as they are distributed in the supply
chain in the US and the EU. These regulations are developed to enhance the capability
in fighting drug counterfeiting, stolen products, and drugs manufactured in a substandard
formula.
6.2.2 DSCSA and FMD Policies
Both DSCSA and FMD mandate that the originators of drugs in the supply chain repre-
sented by manufacturers and packagers need to provide a unique verifiable identifier for
each package, and those identifiers are printed as 2D barcode labels and attached to each
package and lot [111, 112]. Both share many similarities in the type of data needed to build
the unique identifier. The DSCSA requires the use of the National Drug Code (NDC) that
is interchangeable with GTIN in the EU FMD, and both also require that each label con-
tains the lot number, the expiry date, and a serial number for each package. The data
mentioned above is considered as the metadata for every single package.
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The FMD regulation takes a step further by introducing the requirement for the dis-
penser (e.g., a pharmacy) to ensure the verification of the use of each sealable package. The
FMD and DSCSA also define the set of the business processes that a product could experi-
ence throughout the product life cycle based on the GS1 supply chain rules. That includes
all events starting from the time of origin till the drug being dispensed, which requires that
3rd Party Logistics Providers (3PLs) also need to perform verification and decommission-
ing activities and store that in the system with a high level of trust in performing those
operations.
By highlighting those issues and regulatory requirements, the author suggests a Blockchain-
based system that offers a viable solution to simplify the logistical process and enable
quality control throughout the supply chain. The next section describes the technology
and the fit to the drug supply chain regulations.
6.3 Blockchain and Supply Chain
6.3.1 Blockchain Usage in Supply Chain
The usage of Blockchain to enable supply chain applications has received significant at-
tention from many small and big companies to employ Blockchain in enhancing supply
chain processes of tracing and tracking and also in combating the distribution of fake and
counterfeit products.
A few of the worth mentioning projects include IBM and Walmart’s partnership in
the Food Trust project, which builds permissioned, immutable, and shared record of food
system data among all participants in the food supply [113]. In logistics, IBM and Maersk
also partnered to launch a freight network that digitizes and track shipment transactions
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worldwide [114]. Other companies are building Blockchain-based supply chain solutions
for luxury items, such as the latest announcement by the fashion giant LVMH to establish
a provenance platform for its brands such as Luis Vuitton and Christian Dior [115].
Few other startups are also building supply chain platforms for tracing, tracking, and
anti-counterfeiting solutions. The list includes Verisart, Provenance, and VeChain [116].
Many of these solutions focus on art and luxury items and limited evidence of the existence
of solutions targeting pharmaceuticals. To the author’s best knowledge, the only project
in the industry based on the use of Blockchain for the drug supply chain is the MediLedger
project led by drug giant Pfizer and implemented by a California startup, Chronicled Inc.,
[55]. The project uses JP Morgan’s Ethereum-variant platform (Quorum) to launch a
supply chain system for drugs and medicines [117].
6.3.2 NFT Match to Drug Supply Chain Policies
Blockchain’s features of immutability, provenance, and tokenization provide a solution to
meet the requirements of authenticating drugs’ source and secure the supply chain. This
use case presents how non-fungible tokens are used to build a drug supply chain tool that
enables identifiers creation, authentication of origin, transfer of ownership, and accessibility
of drugs information to the different stakeholders, including end customers.
One of the main features of Blockchain is immutability where the committed transac-
tions are irreversible and permanent. For example, a transaction that updates an account
balance is not updating directly a balance field. Rather all recent transactions are grouped
together and used to form a block that once validated is distributed and become linked to
the previous block.
Immutability is an important feature of Blockchain as it ensures that written transac-
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tions and data are unchangeable, and this boosts the trust level among network participants
even with no prior trusted relationship. Another Blockchain feature is provenance, where
an item can be traced to its very first origin. That provides a very powerful tool for au-
diting and the capability of tracing drugs even to identify the original compounds used in
manufacturing.
The author suggests that the features NFTs offer can establish the verifiable immutabil-
ity and authenticity required in addition to other features such as building unique and
related identifiers on both the package and lot level. NFTs also provide simple means for
transfer of ownership, revocation, and metadata representation. Those features are well
mapped to the previously listed drug supply chain processes.
The proposed work, based on the author’s best knowledge, is pioneering the employment
Table 6.1: Blockchain and NFT Match to Drug Supply Chain Policies.
Feature DSCSA FMD Blockchain
Tracking item & lot-level item & lot-level Composable NFTs
Unique Iden-
tifier
NDC, lot number, ex-
piry date, serial num-
ber
GTIN, lot number, ex-
piry date, serial num-
ber
Token Metadata
Events drug manufacturing,
purchase, dispensing
custom NFT change of owner-
ship and other events
records
Data Perse-
verance
Required Required Immutability
Origin Trac-
ing
Required Required Provenance
Trust Level High High in-built features of im-
mutability and prove-
nance
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of the ERC721 and NFTs for tokenizing drug sealable packages and providing supply chain
processes through extending the ERC721 defined interface [118]. The author suggests a
composable structure for the NFT tokens that can enable tracing on package level, lot
level, and even unit level.
6.4 Composable NFTs for Drugs Supply Chain
In this section, an overview of the proposed solution is presented. Particularly, a description
of the proposed composable NFTs is explained. Through the detailed description, snippets
and pseudo-codes of the implemented smart contracts are presented with a description of
the procedures used among the different stakeholders in the supply chain. Fig. 6.1 describes
the overall system components.
6.4.1 Composable NFTs
ERC-721 is established as the de-facto standard for creating non-fungible tokens (NFTs) in
Ethereum Blockchain and other Blockchain platforms. ERC-721 standard is used to rep-
resent unique, digital assets that range from collectible digital cards to real-estate and art
and luxury items. It defines the token-related functions: such as token name or identifier,
symbol, the total supply of tokens, the balance of a specific token, query the ownership of a
token, approval on taking of ownership, transfer of ownership, and retrieval of token meta-
data. It also defines major events related to ownership management, which are Transfer
and Approval events.
In the process of evaluating the use of ERC-721 to represent sealable packages and
identify each package as NFT, a major gap is identified. This gap is related to the fact
129
that regulatory policies require that tracing and identification should be achieved at both
package level and also lot level. However, an ERC-721 token is mapped to a single item
with no relationship among different tokens (items). Therefore, The author investigates
the use of a composition of tokens under a parent token to represent this relationship.
To address this gap, a promising proposal has been evaluated by the author, which is
the Ethereum Improvement Proposal EIP-998 for Composable NFTs [119]. The EIP-998 is
an extension to the ERC721 to enable building composable tokens such that it is possible
to compose lists or trees of simple NFT tokens that have a joint ownership relation. The
entire composition can be transferred with one transaction by changing the root owner of
the composite NFT token.
Figure 6.1: Composable NFT Drugs Supply Chain System Components.
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NFT Tokens Ownership
ERC-721 ownership is determined by an array of token indexes (TokenIds) that is mapped
to the owner Ethereum address. The token ownership can be queried against any tokenId
and returns the owner’s Ethereum address. Transfer of ownership is performed by changing
the owner address value from the old owner to the new owner, given that certain assertions
are validated to ensure that an authorized owner performed the transfer of ownership
action. The ERC-721 also enables adding delegated actions, such as the owner can approve
specific addresses to be able to perform the transfer of ownership on its behalf. This
delegation feature is necessary to enable multiple actors to have access to the tokens and
perform the supply chain process assigned. Listing 6.1. shows the details of the ownership
function and how it is implemented.
mapping (uint256 => address) private owners;
mapping (uint256 => bool) private doesTokenExist;
// Query Token Ownership
function tokenOwner(uint256 tokenId) constant returns (address owner) {
require(doesTokenExist[tokenId ]);
return owners[tokenId ];
}
// Transfer of token ownership
function transfer(address toAddress , uint256 tokenId){
address tokenCurrentOwner = msg.sender;
address tokenNewOwner = toAddress;
// Perform assertion ensure token exists and confirm ownership
require(doesTokenExist[_tokenId ]);
require(tokenCurrentOwner == tokenOwner(tokenId));
require(tokenCurrentOwner != tokenNewOwner);
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require(tokenNewOwner != address (0));
// Perform transfer actions
removeTokenFromOwnerList(tokenId);
tokenBalance[tokenCurrentOwner] -= 1;
owners[tokenId] = tokenNewOwner;
tokenBalance[tokenNewOwner] += 1;
// Record transfer event in Blockchain for auditing
Transfer(tokenCurrentOwner , tokenNewOwner , tokenId);
}
// Delegate authority of invoking transfer actions
function approve(address toAddress , uint256 tokenId){
// Perfrom assertion before delegating
require(msg.sender == tokenOwner(tokenId));
require(msg.sender != toAddress);
// Add delegation
allowed[msg.sender ][ toAddress] = tokenId;
// Record approave event for auditing and tracing
Approval(msg.sender , toAddress , tokenId);
}
Listing 6.1: NFT Token Ownership Functions
Operations of Composable NFTs
Composable NFTs provide a simple way to form composite assets on the Ethereum blockchain,
those assets are still utilizing the same concept of ERC-721 but with the capability to link
between parent tokens and child tokens. The targeted use case in this work utilizes com-
posable NFTs in tracing and tracking drugs in the supply chain that are either composed or
decomposed along the supply chain, e.g., a sealable package in a lot or a generic compound
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origin used in a specific drug.
Composable NFTs, according to the EIP-998, can be formed in a top-down or bottom-
up approach. For this scenario, the author selects a top-down approach where the parent
token is the lot, and the child token is the package, with a traceability feature from top-
down and bottom-up directions. The need for implementing tracing in both directions is
introduced to satisfy different supply chain processes.
The need for tracing in both directions is highlighted in two examples. A recall event
usually starts by the manufacturer and with the main parameter being the lot number. In
this case, the lot number is an identifier for the parent token; thus, the recall action should
be able to result in notifications to owners (distributors/retailers/consumers) of affected
packages belonging to that lot. On the other side of the chain, a customer querying about
a specific package issues the query based on the child token identifier. For transparency,
the customer should be able to see the transfer of ownership happening on the lot level to
confirm adherence to certain policies.
Using composable NFTs to perform drug supply chain procedures according to the
FMD and CSDSA regulations is simplified in a series of actions that are described and
defined hereafter as well as the key requirements for the proper operation of the proposed
approach.
1. Access to token minting and creation is granted only to the legitimate manufacturers
that are assumed to be the original owner of a drug.
2. The manufacturer can create tokens in batches.
3. The capability of storing metadata in a readable and accessible format.
4. The smart contracts can generate the required randomness for the identifiers.
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5. The capability to perform operations of composition and decomposition on tokens.
6. The required events by both regulations to enable tracing, tracking and query of
change of ownership and origin shall be recorded on-chain.
7. Visibility on information to all stakeholders and the capability of invoking queries.
For the first item, bootstrapping the network is assumed to be performed to ensure
only legitimate manufacturers can create tokens and thus ensure the provenance feature
and capability to trace drug item change of ownership since the origin. This requirement
is necessary to eliminate non-authorized access and to combat counterfeiting. The author
assumes the role of a system administrator to handle manufacturers’ registration. The
possibility of decentralized verification of the legitimacy of manufacturers is not within
the scope of this work. However, the author envisions the use of a Blockchain solution
based on the Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs), [56], in a similar approach to the Verifiable
Organization Network (VON) deployed by the Province of British Columbia in Canada to
register business entities [104].
The second requirement is to ensure effectiveness in operation and thus lowering the
cost of creating tokens. For ensuring portability, each token has metadata that and can be
retrieved using the tokenId. The token metadata representing package or lot attributes are
stored off-chain using off-chain database with the possibility to choose decentralized storage
such as IPFS. The FMD regulation mandates the fourth requirement, and it is ensured
through the use of a hashing function that digests the metadata provided in addition to a
timestamp to generate a random serial number for each token.
To ensure the capability to provide tracing and tracking on package and lot level, the
proposed composable NFTs require that the smart contract should provide two functions
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that perform the function of compositions and decomposition. The first function constructs
a composite asset from a number of child tokens or amends child tokens to an existing
composable NFT. That also includes the step of updating the parent field of the child
tokens with the tokenId of main composable NFT. The decomposition function dismantles
a composable NFT and voids the parent token relationship to the child tokens.
Preserving the events initiated by the different stakeholders in the supply chain and
ensure its visibility among them is achieved by utilizing the Events feature in Ethereum
smart contracts. A specific event in the smart contract is used for each operation to register
the actions performed by all actors in the supply chain. All these events are stored on-
chain for visibility and indexed using tokenId, manufacturer, owner, and with a timestamp
to allow easy retrieval and querying capability. The overall process of establishing and
building the composable NFTs representing the drug packages is as follows.
• An authority is assigned the role of an administrator to approve all registration
requests by manufacturers and thus boost the trust level of the network.
• Manufacturers utilize a token generation smart contract for batches of drugs with
main parameters required, such as lot number, CDN/GTIN, expiry date, manufac-
turer details (name, country of origin, manufacturing facility .. etc). The token
generation smart contract generates the serial number required by the regulation,
which is used as the NFT tokenId.
• The tokenId is generated using a Keccak hashing function that consumes as input
all the supplied in addition to the current timestamp to ensure uniqueness and ran-
domness.
• A composition function is called to form a composable token representing a lot.
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• Upon an event of selling, or in general, transfer of ownership of drugs from one entity
to another, a batch transfer function is called.
• In the event of dispensing, a transfer of ownership function is called to change the
owner parameter of the tokens to the end-user and locking the transfer feature.
6.4.2 Details of Smart Contract Implementation
This section details the implemented smart contracts that are developed to fulfill the re-
quirements. The implementation requires two smart contracts; the first is the manufacturer
registrar (Manufacturer Registrar - MR), and the second is the Composable NFT Manager
(CNFT).
Manufacturer Registrar Smart Contract
The MR smart contract implements the functions for managing the information of manu-
facturers, including the functions of manufacturers’ enrollment and manufacturers’ verifi-
cation. The current implementation assumes a permissioned ledger, where the existence of
an oversight body to act as an administrator for the MR smart contract is necessary. The
drug administration authority is the default actor that can assume the administrator role.
The administrator role requires the validation of the submitted manufacturer informa-
tion to ensure that the root of the process is kept intact and boosts the trust relationship
among all other parties. By ensuring a verifiable and validated identity of the manufacturer,
then the origin of all drug tokens creation is ensured to be intact and no counterfeiting.
The author does not propose a fully decentralized approach since the nature of the applica-
tion require authority oversight. However, the author suggests that in case of the existence
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of a DID and verifiable credential network similar to the VON network, [104], for man-
ufacturers, then the MR smart contract can leverage that for validating manufacturers’
registration requests.
Algorithm 4: Manufacturer Smart Contract
Input: Manufacturer Information and Ethereum Address, Admin EA
Result: Manufacturer Ethereum Address (EA) Added to Authorized List L
procedure MRContractCreation(AdminEA)
Owner ⇐ AdminEA ;
procedure EnrollManufacturer(Manufacturer Info) Manufacturer submit
enroll request;
if information provided complete then
if Admin Approval then
L⇐ [L,EA] ;
Event (EA,Name, T imestamp);
else
Ignore;
end
else
Ignore;
end
Algorithm 4. shows the pseudo-code of the MR smart contract, the smart contract
includes the owner variable which is assigned to the administrator, upon invoking the
smart contract creation the owner variable is assigned to the administrator Ethereum
address. A manufacturer submits an enrollment request, including the parameters of the
manufacturer name, country, license number, and Ethereum address. The manufacturer
enrollment process requires a validation step by the administrator to approve the request
and commit the manufacturer Ethereum address in the list of authorized manufacturers.
Listing 6.2. is a snippet of the MR smart contract that shows the main variables and data
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structures used.
contract MR {
address admin;
struct asignee {
address assignee;
uint8 privileges;
}
struct manufacturer {
address ea;
bytes32 name;
bytes16 country;
bytes32 license;
uint8 reputation;
}
Constructor {
admin = msg.sender; }
...
}
Listing 6.2: Manufacturer Registrar Smart Contract Variables
Composable NFT Smart Contract
The composable tokens CNFT smart contract is created by each manufacturer. The CNFT
smart contract is an extended version of the ERC-721 standard with two main functions
added that perform the functions of (de)composition of composite assets. The CNFT
smart contract also adds other main variables such as rootOwner and childTokens, to allow
traversing the ownership of composable tokens in top-down and bottom-up directions.
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The CNFT smart contract in addition to the (de)compostion functions four other main
functions:
• createToken(): For a new batch of drugs, the manufacturer invokes this function
to generate the NFT tokens for each package and call the composition function to
generate a composite asset for the lot.
• transferOwnership(): To support tracing and tracking, the CNFT smart contract
extends the transfer function in Listing 1. to include the capability to reflect a
change of ownership of all child tokens as well as the rootOwner. This function is
called for each shipping, selling, or dispensing event in the supply chain management.
• batchTransfer(): This function supports transferring batches of packages that belong
to the same lot. The function iterates through the list of tokenIds for all packages
need to be transferred and perform the (de)composition steps required to update
ownership details.
• getOwnership(): this is a query that will traverse the composable NFT to return the
single token owner as well as the root owner token.
Listings 6.3 and 6.4 show the details of the create token function and batch transfer
function.
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Algorithm 5: NFT Batch Transfer Function
Input: [tokenIds ...], fromAddr, toAddr
Result: Updated list of childTokens in original and destination CNFTs
if fromAddr == requestSender ‖isApproved(requestSender) then
for i← 0 to tokenId.length 1 do
tokens[fromAddr]⇐ [tokens[fromAddr], pop(tokenId)];
tokens[toAddr]⇐ [tokens[toAddr], tokenId];
tokens[tokenID][toAddr].owner = fromAddr;
tokens[tokenID][toAddr].rootOwner = fromAddr;
end
else
Ignore;
end
function createToken(bytes32 cdn , bytes16 lotNumber , uint32 expiryDate)
public returns (uint256) {
require (msg.sender == adminAddress);
tokenCount ++;
tokenId = keccak256(cdn , lotNumber , expiryDate , block.timestamp);
tokenIdToTokenOwner[tokenCount] = msg.sender;
tokenOwnerToTokenCount[msg.sender ]++;
emit (tokenId , cdn , lotNumber , msg.sender);
return tokenId;
}
Listing 6.3: Create Token Function
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function batchTransfer(address fromAddr , address toAddr , uint256 []
tokenIds) external {
// Perform necessary assertions
require(_to != address (0x0), "ensure that destination address is non -
zero.");
require(fromAddr == msg.sender || operatorApproval[fronAddr ][msg.
sender] == true);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokenIds.length; ++i) {
uint256 id = tokenIds[i];
tokens[fromAddr] = tokens[id][ fromAddr ].sub(id);
tokens[toAddr] = tokens.add(tokensId[id]);
}
// MUST emit event to register that on -chain
emit TransferBatch(msg.sender , fromAddr , toAddrs , tokenIds);
}
Listing 6.4: Batch Transfer Function
Proof of Concept Environment
The proposal implements a proof of a concept for a tool to be used in the drug supply
chain traceability system that adheres to the DSCSA and FMD requirements. The imple-
mentation is performed in a testbed where the smart contracts were deployed on a private
Ethereum node with the following specifications: Dell OptiPlex 7010, with Intel Core i5
Quad 3.20 GHz processor, 4 GB main memory and 64-bit Windows 7 Professional OS. The
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proposed tool requires performing a thorough evaluation to discuss questions regarding the
total system cost of ownership, scalability, and privacy.
The cost of the system is considered to be affected by the Gas paid for performing each
transaction. However, that is the case for a public Blockchain. The expected deployment
scenario is an enterprise system and a permissioned Blockchain configuration where Gas
cost is not relevant.
6.4.3 Summary
The proposed use case addresses a critical requirement in the pharmaceutical supply chain
system imposed by the regulatory bodies. The use case utilizes Blockchain tokenization
and composable assets in building a tool that enables tracking and tracing of drugs’ lots
and packages. The use case provides an enhancement in records accessibility and interop-
erability and in establishing trust.
The use case, however, includes specific limitations. The main issue is system scalability,
for example, the capability of handling the creation of batches of new items. Our proposal
tested the creation of 100 tokens in a single transaction; however, further testing is required
to assess the trade-off between the number of tokens created in a single transaction and
the cost associated. The administration of the network and governance is also a factor that
needs to be further investigated. That includes the need to devise of a mechanism to boost
the root of trust of the network in the initial phase, and also in establishing a reputation
model for the different parties involved.
Finally, privacy is a concern, especially when the ownership of the product reaches the
end customer. Suggested future work is to look at investigating the use of Zero-Knowledge
Proof algorithms, to provide full privacy over the records of ownership [120].
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Chapter 7
Data Provenance and Verifiability in
IoT Networks
IoT devices generate data that is processed by different machine learning methods, which
are controlled by a diversified list of actors. Moreover, open data models are becoming
mainstream for distributing IoT datasets, which requires a mechanism that can prove
data derivatives authenticity, and ownership. This chapter presents how the proposed
decentralized IoT identity management framework can be extended to support application
layer processes that are decentralized and distributed. In this chapter, the author shows
how the proposed framework is exploited in building the concept of provenant and verifiable
data paths. The approach explains how to build a trusted data chain where datasets
generated and processed are stamped using the actor DID signature and presented as
verifiable credentials traced to its origin. An example is presented to demonstrate how this
concept can be utilized in different IoT verticals.
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7.1 Data Provenance in IoT
IoT networks bring value by integrating data from different sources, which can be problem-
atic due to network heterogeneity and dynamic nature. Questioning how to authenticate
the sources of the data raises the concern of IoT network vulnerability and the possibility
of manipulating and inserting inauthentic records along the data path. This problem is
addressed using the techniques of data provenance and verifiable claims.
Data provenance allows a verifying party to check datasets’ authenticity to the origin.
That can enable tracking the dataset throughout the data path from the source where it
is gathered through all the processing pipeline and thus offer the capability to identify any
inauthentic data handling. Data provenance has been addressed by both centralized and
decentralized approaches, including:
• Centralized Logging: Using centralized and standalone systems that keep records of
data generated and log it with necessary metadata, e.g., timestamp, location, and
others. One example is the S2Logger system used to track the transmission of data
among hosts in the cloud. The main issue with this mechanism is that it is isolated,
either in local hosts or within separated networks [121].
• Cryptography Functions: Hashing functions and digital signatures present a method
to confirm data integrity and ownership. However, this approach has the drawback
of the difficulty of keys management in heterogeneous networks and also the lack of
capability to track data changes along the processing pipeline [122].
• On-Chain Recording: The use of smart contracts and Blockchain to track data prove-
nance is achieved by recording data generation and processing events on-chain and
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thus maintain a trail of data origin and changes through the record lifetime. The
primary issue for this approach is the interoperability across different chains [123].
This chapter introduces how to utilize the concept of DIDs and VCs along with smart
contracts and DLT to build verifiable data chain for IoT networks and addresses this
through IoT examples with an initial focus on the example of collecting IoT data in a
mobility network. The mobility network example is used to describe the overall concept
which is described in the next sections how it can be applied in other verticals
7.2 System Overview
In describing the proposed concept, a smart vehicular network is used. It is assumed that
the vehicles are equipped with a set of sensors that collect information for use by inter-
nal subsystems or external entities in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) or vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2X) data exchanges.
7.2.1 Network Components
Building a verifiable vehicular network data path combines a set of components that include
first the vehicular network elements and the components responsible for maintaining data
provenance. Figure 7.1 depicts the different network components that consist of:
• Vehicles: Vehicles and sensors are the main components producing and originating
mobility data. Each vehicle owns a DID based on the vehicle identification number
(VIN), while sensors might or might not own a DID depending on their capability.
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Figure 7.1: Verifiable Data Paths Network Components
• Intelligent Transportation Infrastructure: This component includes different systems
in the infrastructure such as traffic lights, roadside units (RSUs), parking meters,
tolling stations, and others. These components also own their DIDs and can originate
data, aggregate it, or forward it.
• External Data Sources: This component pertains to data sources used to augment the
measured and collected vehicular data, e.g., weather information and traffic patterns.
• Blockchain: Blockchain usage through smart contracts enables building a data chain
and provide the provenance feature. Data created are hashed and stored on-chain,
and all subsequent transformations are linked and stored to provide an auditing trail.
• DID/VC infrastructure: DIDs are the foundational component to offer unique global
identifiers for all actors, while VCs are the component used to prove the authenticity
of data records. Each data record or set has a verifiable credential issued by, and
link to the actor DID. This component includes DIDs hubs and resolvers.
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7.2.2 Verifiable Data Path
DIDs and VCs are the cornerstones for establishing secure and provenant data chains. To
achieve global provenance, each sensor with processing capability is assigned a unique DID
at manufacturing, and each processing unit, including the vehicle itself, is also assigned a
DID. DIDs are also assigned to infrastructure elements in case of V2X data exchange, and
to complete the path also entities and processing engines (a data pre-processing or ML
algorithm) should be assigned their respective DIDs, as indicated in Figure 7.2.
It is also assumed that entities can encompass other entities, e.g., a vehicle containing a
set of sensors and subsystems. Thus, DIDs are issued with support for sub-identities, where
a DID might contain a parent DID, and child DID fields or both. The DIDs, as shown
in Figure 7.2, can be based on different methods to ensure working cross-organizationally.
The main requirement is the accessibility of each DID method resolver to the participating
verifiers.
Figure 7.2: A Verifiable Mobility Data Path.
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The issued DID for each actor in the data path contains the typical fields for any DID
in addition to the parent DID and child DID if they exist. An example of a vehicle DID
is given below. The DID also contains the proof field that is digitally signed by the issuer
key (e.g., manufacturer) to ensure the integrity of the DID document.
{
"@context ": "https :// w3id.org/did/v1",
"id": "did:vin:1fuj ..4063" ,
"publicKey ": [{
"type": "Secp256k1VerificationKey2018",
"owner ": "did:vin:1fuj ..4063" ,
"ethereumAddress ": "0x2dE5 ... A8Be"}],
"authentication ": [{
"type": "Secp256k1SignatureAuthentication2018",
"publicKey ": "did:vin:0 x2dE5 ... A8Be#owner "}],
"childDID ": [{"id": "did:uuid :4435..4545"}] ,
"proof ":{
"type": "Secp256k1VerificationKey2018",
proofPurpose: "assertionMethod",
"created ": "2019 -12 -23 T14 :53:03Z",
"verificationMethod ": "did:ethr:0 x2fa3 ..4a62#issuer",
"jws": "eyJhbGciOi ... tx0dPfDi0 "}
"created ": "2019 -12 -23 T14 :53:03Z",
"updated ": "2019 -12 -23 T14 :53:03Z"
}
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7.2.3 Verifiable Data Claims
Generating a verifiable data path is achieved through a series of steps that create a verifiable
claim (VC) for each data record or set of records. Deciding on the number of records that
share a VC depends on the data record size and frequency of data generation. Each VC
has a size of a few hundred bytes, thus adding a VC for each data record might constitute
a significant overhead. The generation of a VC for a set of data records utilizes DIDs,
Blockchain, and cryptography functions represented by hashing and digital signature; the
complete flow is described hereafter and illustrated in Figure 7.3.
Generating Claims
Producing a variable dataset starts by combining a set of records and generate a hash value
to ensure the integrity of the data records. Proof of issuance is produced and represented
by the digital signature of the RecordHash using the actor DID private key. Therefore, for a
set of collected data records {D0, D1, ...Dn} the above-mentioned steps can be summarized
by the following equations.
RecordHash = SHA256( D0, D1, . . . , Dn)
Proof = SignactorPrivateKey(RecordHash)
 (7.1)
The third required field in a VC is the last transaction hash, which is used to build the
auditing trail. The three fields are used to generate a VC in addition to a metadata field
listing the main properties of the data set. Upon generating the VC, the hash of the VC is
calculated, which is then committed on-chain to ensure the integrity of the chain of proofs,
thus providing the feature of provenance.
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Verifying Claims
On the consuming side, once a dataset is obtained by an entity, the origin and authenticity
of the data are verified by first hashing the dataset and verifying it against the latest
VC. For a transformed dataset, multiple VCs exist, and the process requires verifying the
signature of the proof of each VC against the DID of the corresponding actor.
To ensure that the data throughout the path has not been manipulated, a VC shall
contain a link to the previously issued VC represented by the transaction hash. Thus,
by verifying all the transactions, it ensures that the trail of transformation is authentic.
So, each VC ensures that the action performed is actually performed by the same actor
according to the DID, while the chain of transactions hashes confirm that the path is intact.
Figure 7.3: Verifiable Data Claims Processing.
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A generated VC contains mandatory fields used to prove the integrity and ownership
and to enable extracting the provenance trace. An example of a VC created for an ac-
celerometer measurement record is shown below.
• Issuer: linking the VC to the issuer DID.
• Proof: containing the digital signature of the data records hash using the actor’s
private key, represented in JSON Web Signature (JWS) format.
• Transaction Hash: the last transaction hash is used to build an immutable data
chain.
{
"@context ": "https ://www.w3.org /2018/ credentials/v1",
"id": "http :// server/credentials /1872" ,
"type": [" VerifiableCredential", "DataCredential "],
"credentialSubject ": { "id": "http :// server/records /5832" ,
"issuer ": "did:imei :3520..0826" ,
"issuanceDate ": "2019 -12 -24 T11 :33:24Z",
"RecordHash" : "62c3... fbde" },
"proof ": { "type": "Secp256k1VerificationKey2018",
"created ": "2019 -12 -24 T11 :33:24Z",
"proofPurpose ": "assertionMethod",
"verificationMethod ":" did:imei :3520..0826" ,
"transHash" : "0x2c34 ...8 df2",
"jws": "eyJh ... Kb78" }
}
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7.3 Linked Data Proofs
Building a provenance trace and a data chain requires linking the verifiable claims issued
for the data set and its derivatives. The suggested approach allows the extraction of the
provenance trace by linking the data proofs using the hash of the previous VC. Upon
querying the blockchain for a specific VC hash, the returned object contains the previous
VC id, which is a URL to access the VC. Repeatedly, the verifier pulls the dataset using
the id record in the credentialsSubject field hash it and verifies it against the VC proof.
The process continues until reaching the original dataset for which the corresponding VC
record on-chain has a null value for the URL, indicating it is the genesis VC.
Since certain datasets may propagate through different actors while remaining the same,
building a trace of data provenance requires the capability to authenticate the integrity
and ownership of the dataset with a compact representation. A VC representation, in this
case, can include instead of the proof field a proof chain field. A proof chain is useful to
allow validating a data set that has been signed by multiple entities while the order of
proofs generation is important.
The flow for performing the procedure to verify the provenance of a data set is illustrated
in Figure 7.4. The illustration describes the steps for an example of an open data set
generated by several sensors owned by entity A, e.g., a vehicle. The collected data is pre-
processed (e.g., handling missing values) by entity B. The dataset is later used by entity
C to run a specific machine learning algorithm (e.g., k-mean clustering) and generate a
labeled dataset. A user that is accessing the labeled dataset runs the steps in the procedure
to verify the data authenticity along the whole data path to its provenance.
The next section describes an example to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed
concept. This example is not intended to include thorough performance analysis of the
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concept. Nevertheless, it aspires to present evidence on the extendability of the thesis
suggested framework in building decentralized IoT applications.
7.4 Smart Mobility Example
This section describes a simple setup using a crowdsensing scenario where users’ smart-
phones, equipped with accelerometers, are used to collect the acceleration reading on 3-axis
while driving a vehicle around the city. To emulate the suggested scenarios, four different
smartphones were mounted in separate trips on a vehicle to collect the measurements,
which are assumed to be used to build a model for road surface conditions and pothole
detection. In the experiment, each smartphone is issued a DID using its IMEI identifier
and the raw data gathered by the accelerometer is stamped with the DID issued to each
smartphone.
Three separate trips were made by riding the city bus and assuming that the city
performed a pre-processing task to clean any missing values before publishing the data.
The pre-processed accelerometer readings on bus trips are signed by the city DID.
To show how a provenance test can run, a separate set of accelerometer readings col-
lected in a scenario where the smartphone device is placed in a user’s pocket while running.
This set of records where uploaded as part of the crowdsensed data with an invalid proof
field and digital signature in the verifiable claim.
For the purpose of demonstrating the entire process, a simple algorithm was used
to generate a labeled data set for collected data. A z-threshold algorithm is used that
classifies any measured value on the z-axis reading above 1g (9.8m/s2) as a pothole. The
algorithm uses the data collected from all trips, including the injected data collected from
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a smartphone while the user is running.
The experiment was conducted over a route of a length of 3.2 km starting from the
location given by the coordinates (43.45259816,-80.55250328) to the point (43.47029615,-
80.53797224), as indicated in Figure 7.5. The process of generating data claims and veri-
fying them includes:
• Collect data records over a single trip by a smartphone.
• Upon finishing a trip, the data records are saved in a CSV file an d then hashed, and
a VC is created using the smartphone DID attributes.
• Both the data records and the generated VC are uploaded, and the VC hash is
committed on-chain.
Figure 7.5: Map Showing The Path Used for Car and Bus Trips to Collect Accelerometer
Readings.
155
• Similarly, the corresponding VCs for the bus trips data and the data collected for a
running user are generated and uploaded.
• Before running the z-threshold algorithm, all data records and corresponding VCs
are verified.
• Given that the list of participants is known and the corresponding DIDs are known,
the verification step identifies the misleading data records collected by a different
smartphone.
• The z-threshold algorithm, which is owned by a certain research entity owning a
specific DID, processes the data and generates a labeled dataset identifying each
coordinate in the path as if it contains a pothole or not.
• The generated labeled set is saved, and a VC is generated using the same steps.
Based on this experiment, it is noted that collecting small records from several sensors
and aggregating the data to build a dataset can grow in size. Since each smartphone has
its unique DID, thus each trip data is issued a VC proof signed by the specified DID.
Therefore, collecting measurements in (n) number of trips means creating a new dataset
that has (n) different VCs.
Based on the results, for the trip specified above, each data record has an overhead, due
to VC attachment, of approximately 1.75 KBytes representing around 7-8% of the original
data record size. Thus, building a dataset based on (n) measurements that include all VCs
of each record will increase the size to grow to n*1.76 KBytes, yet it still contributes to an
overhead of 7-8%. That is attributed to the fact that using the data record hash to build
the VC makes the VC size almost fixed with a small margin, which depends on the URL
length.
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7.5 COVID-19 Contact Tracing Example
Late 2019, a new strand of the Corona virus family, called COVID-19, spread in specific
Chinese cities to spread later across the globe. The WHO has announced the COVID-
19 outbreak a pandemic [124]. Among the main measures, imposed internationally, to
limit the spread and flatten the curve of number of cases is social distancing. The social
distancing measure requires to maintain a distance of 2 metres (6 feet) between people
in public places. Though, adherence by the public due for instance to the impossible
complete shutdown limited the effectiveness of this measure. Furthermore, the pattern of
virus spread showed that it can long persist on surfaces and it can be transferred through
asymptomatic patients [125].
With the limitations and difficulties of imposing social distancing, other ways to trace
infected people and who they came close to become important. Countries like China and
Singapore used widely contact tracing to be able to identify people at risk of capturing the
virus. Though, concerns on privacy mounted as people felt a very high level of surveillance
[126].
As the outbreak spread to more countries, the tech-community worldwide stepped to
propose solutions for virus spread prediction and contact tracing. A noteworthy project is
the PrivateKit SafePath mobile app by MIT researchers [127]. The PrivateKit application
records all user movements by continuously recording the GPS coordinate. In an interview
with IEEE spectrum, it has been criticised that such an invasive approach can risk the
users’ privacy, and the MIT researchers responded that data is encrypted and not readable
even by the cloud host [128].
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7.5.1 Application Design
In addressing these issues, the author, in this example, demonstrates how DIDs and VCs
applied through the concept of verifiable data path can solve these issues. The example is
demonstrated using a mobile app that the users opt-in to record places visited including
trips made on public transportation. The user is issued a DID that is linked to no other
physical identities and all data collected is only associated to the user DID thus ensuring
that all data is anonymous. The complete flow is described in the following steps:
• The user adds points that include geographic coordinates and a timestamp and all
data is saved internally on the user device.
• Once the user tested positive or suspected being exposed to the virus, the user can
upload the data to the cloud.
• Once the user issues the upload the command, the process described in 7.3 is followed.
The data records for traces of user whereabouts is first hashed and VC is generated
using the user DID.
• The VC hash is committed on-chain and appended to the data records to be submit-
ted and stored in the cloud.
• The flow assumes an authority responsible on further verifying uploaded data specif-
ically positive cases. This entity can be a public health department.
• The public health department issues a VC using the department DID that is ap-
pended to the data records to a linked data proof.
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7.5.2 Establishing The Root of Trust
Among the major issue of contact tracing applications is the trustworthiness of data up-
loaded by the users. A false positive case that is claimed by a user results in false notifica-
tions for quarantine and self-isolation for people who came in close contact with the falsely
claimed case. Therefore, the suggested approach proposed the use of DIDs and VCs to
eliminate this issue, and to further enhance the trustworthiness of the data the following
system setup is suggested.
The suggested setup looks at the main stakeholders in the process; the user and the
public health departments. Once a DID is generated for the user inside the application,
the health department issues a verifiable credential for the user DID to prove the validity
of the DID.
In addition, as mentioned above, the uploaded data records for positive cases are
amended with a VC issued by the health authority. Thus, the trust is established through
Figure 7.6: The Flow of Verifiable Credentials Generation for COVID-19 Application of
Contact Tracing.
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verifying that the data is issued by a trusted DID and by verifying that claimed positive
cases include a chain proof that includes two VCs, one issued by the user and one amended
by the health authority. Figure 7.6 depicts the trust links and the listing below shows an
example of a data record with a chain of proofs.
7.6 Summary
In this thesis, it has been shown that decentralized IoT devices’ identities are crucial
for building decentralized authentication and access management. However, this chapter
describes that the exploitation of this foundation layer is not limited to the core device
management functionalities, and it is extended to enable decentralized services in the
application layer and specifically to enable building verifiable data paths. The proposal
describes an example of a mobility network scenario though this applies to any data path,
including medical and health IoT networks and supply chain and industrial IoT networks.
The concept builds on the usage of DIDs, verifiable claims, and the immutability of
Blockchain records to build a data chain that is traced to the origin of the data derivative.
Moreover, a provenance and verifiable trace enable securing the data path from illegitimate
manipulation of data records and possible injection of inauthentic records.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter provides a brief summary of the thesis and future directions. Section 8.1
concludes the thesis, and Section 8.2 highlights the main points for research opportunities
to extend this work further.
8.1 Conclusion
Recent developments in IoT networks promise an ecosystem where devices have the ability
to interact and communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer model without a centralized
authority that plays the role of identifying and authenticating the devices and authoriz-
ing access to offered services. Furthermore, the challenges imposed by the complexity of
heterogeneous IoT networks stimulated research interest in building decentralized architec-
tures focusing on enabling decentralized device management functionalities as a foundation
that can be extended for offering decentralized services and applications.
The work presented in this thesis describes the development of a decentralized IoT
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devices identity and access management framework that can be used in enabling peer-to-
peer and decentralized IoT applications. The work in this thesis addresses three main
challenges:
• IoT networks are characterized by being heterogeneous, and most of these networks
are built with fragmented identity management structures. These factors impose a
challenge on the capability of enabling user/device-centric services.
• The mobility of IoT devices requires a global and unique identification scheme sup-
porting identity portability and self-ownership with the capability of maintaining the
history of the device life cycle events.
• The growth in adopting IoT applications based on peer-to-peer models highlighted
the need for authentication and authorization schemes with no middleman involved.
The presented work defines a framework that has a foundation of decentralized identity
management. The identity framework is built using W3C specifications of Decentralized
Identifiers (DID) and Verifiable Claims (VCs). An IoT DID method has been devised de-
scribing the CRUD operations of IoT devices identities. The work of the thesis utilizes the
DID method in drafting a mutual authentication scheme that involves no central authority
with perfect forward secrecy.
In addressing the challenge of enabling a decentralized access control mechanism, the
thesis work presented an authorization approach by mapping the capability-based access
control model (CapBAC) to the non-fungible (ERC721) blockchain tokenization standard.
The approach demonstrates how access tokens are designed to be a self-contained policy
control function and can be defined as collectibles that support an economy of exchange
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and trading for access tokens. The fungible (ERC20) token is utilized as a facility for
services exchange that can be performed with accounting and charging support.
Blockchain main challenges are related to its distributed nature, which is mainly intro-
ducing delay and overhead. The work evaluates the proposed access model using a testbed,
where the results show the feasibility of the suggested approach with further investigation
required to compare the performance when the same approach is implemented on top of
PoS and DPoS consensus algorithms. The data overhead issue observed in the testbed
results also requires an assessment of a trade-off between embedding the token as a whole
or just the token ID and offloading the token retrieval task to a gateway. Such an approach
is expected to introduce communication overhead since the token need to be retrieved in
each request.
The suggested framework has been applied in two use cases that include a suggestion for
an improvement of the IMEIDB system used to combat counterfeiting and loss and theft
of smartphones. Another supply chain use case addressed building a tracing and tracking
system to adhere to the recent FMD and DSCSA drug regulations by utilizing composable
non-fungible tokens to track pharmaceutical products on both unit and lot level.
The capability of extending the framework for the application layer and addressing data
ownership and authenticity was addressed through the data provenance concept in which
a verifiable chain of data for IoT data is built utilizing devices decentralized identities and
capability of generating linked data proofs.
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8.2 Future Work
Decentralized IoT device identity and access management field continues to receive at-
tention in both academia and industry and represents an active area of research and de-
velopment. The tendency for decentralized approaches and offering device owners more
control over their data brings many new challenges. Though, as the Blockchain technology
matures and more IoT business use cases emerge, new research venues for extending this
work are sought.
8.2.1 Permissioned and Proof-of-Stake DLTs
This thesis work is based on utilizing a permissionless DLT platform that uses the PoW
consensus mechanism. The main challenges for such a platform are the speed, and the
privacy concern, which permissioned and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) promise to resolve. PoS
is considered to be a primary consensus algorithm for most public Blockchain to replace
PoW, including Etherum, which will help in speeding up the number of transactions per
second and provide the capability to host applications for larger IoT networks. On the
other hand, permissioned DLTs such as Hyperledger Fabric provide a setup that offers
enterprises higher throughput and more privacy.
Migrating the framework to PoS once it is released is a straightforward extension and
enhancement of this work. Furthermore, particular use cases would require migrating this
framework to permissioned DLT platforms. The thesis author has joined the Hyperledger
Telecom Special Interest Working group to extend this work to these platforms [105].
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8.2.2 Privacy and Anonymity
Blockchain technology was built to enhance trust and transparency, though some applica-
tions require the protection of participants’ privacy and having anonymous identities. The
field of zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a research topic that is sought to be a venue for
extending this work.
While using DIDs and Smart contracts in this work presented the capability to build
a unique global identity, though, as devices start to transact, identity traces can be a
source of a breach for devices’ privacy. ZKP algorithms enable two entities to successfully
exchange information and transact without the need to expose sensitive data. Obscuring
IoT devices sensitive identification information is a very active research domain. This work
provided a decentralized IoT devices identity approach using DIDs and VCs, which the
later possess many attributes to extend it into a ZKP authentication framework. Verifiable
claims can be extended to a ZKP proof format using features such as selective disclosure to
present the minimal set of data for verification purposes [129]. Notable research challenges
in this regard include designing ZKP algorithms that are lightweight, and among them
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs NIZKP [120, 52].
8.2.3 Reputation Management
In decentralized systems, the absence of a middleman or an authority requires a mechanism
for establishing the root of trust. It has been highlighted in this work that the usage of
Blockchain and DIDs and VCs helps in establishing a root of trust. However, an extension
to this work would include defining a reputation management framework that offers a
scoring mechanism to permit devices to evaluate reliability of other devices and establish
a score for each device that is used as a factor in granting or revoking access requests.
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